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THE TAXATION OF INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL
Lily Kahng*
Abstract
Intellectual capital-broadly defined to include nonphysical sources
of value such as patents and copyrights, computer software,
organizational processes, and know-how-has a long history of being
undervalued and excluded from measures of economic productivity and
wealth. In recent years, however, intellectual capital has finally gained
wide recognition as a central driver of economic productivity and
growth. Scholars in fields such as knowledge management, financial
accounting, and national accounting have produced a wealth of research
that significantly advances the conceptual understanding of intellectual
capital and introduces new methodologies for identifying and measuring
its economic value.
This Article is the first to analyze and assess the taxation of
intellectual capital within this broader interdisciplinary landscape.
Informed by the recent research and reform efforts in these areas of
management and accounting, the Article finds that tax law, which
allows deductions for most investments in intellectual capital, is
fundamentally flawed. This results in the loss of hundreds of billions of
dollars in tax revenues, costly misallocations of resources, and a grave
deviation from the accurate measure of income. This Article argues that,
consistent with the prevailing view in other fields, investments in
intellectual capital ought to be capitalized under tax law. Drawing upon
the work of reform proponents in other fields, as well as that of their
critics, the Article considers whether and to what extent the advances in
other disciplines can be adapted to the tax system. Based on that
analysis, this Article proposes to reform tax law to require businesses to
capitalize and amortize over five years a broad array of intellectual
capital investments, including research and development, advertising,
worker training, and strategic planning.
* Professor of Law, Seattle University. I am grateful to Steve Arkin, Yariv Brauner,
Mary Louise Fellows, Monica Gianni, Anthony Infanti, Calvin Johnson, Ronald Krotoszynski,
Charlene Luke, Omri Marian, Shannon McCormack, Martin McMahon, Scott Schumacher,
Daniel Sichel, and the participants of the 2014 Critical Tax Conference, the University of
Florida Graduate Tax Policy Colloquium, the Seattle University Law School Faculty Workshop,
and the University of Washington Law School Graduate Tax Program Colloquium for their
helpful comments. I also thank Kelly Kunsch, Seattle University law librarian, for his invaluable
research assistance.
2230 FLORIDA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 66
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 2230
I. INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: DEFINITION AND PRELIMINARY
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES .......................................................... 2234
II. INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL RESEARCH, FINDINGS, AND
RE FORM S ............................................................................ 2238
A. Knowledge Management ............................................ 2238
B. Financial Accounting ................................................. 2241
1. Current Treatment of Intellectual Capital ............. 2242
2. Research and Reforms .......................................... 2244
C. National Accounting ................................................... 2247
1. Current Treatment of Intellectual Capital ............. 2248
2. Research and Reforms .......................................... 2249
III. THE CURRENT TAX TREATMENT OF INTELLECTUAL
C APITA L .............................................................................. 2253
A. In Principle: The "Norm of Capitalization ".............. 2253
B. In Practice: "Deductibility
as the Default Rule". .................................................. 2257
1. Acquired Intellectual Capital ................................ 2257
2. Self-Created Intellectual Capital .......................... 2259
C. The Costs of Improper Tax Treatment of
Intellectual Capital ..................................................... 2263
IV. ASSESSMENT AND REFORM ................................................. 2267
A. Financial Accounting and Tax ................................... 2267
B. National Accounting and Tax ..................................... 2272
C. Reform Proposal ......................................................... 2274
C ON CLU SION ...................................................................................... 2277
INTRODUCTION
Intellectual capital refers to nonphysical sources of value such as
patents, software, and brand names, which are often labor intensive to
create.1 Though the term "intellectual capital" is relatively new,2 the
concept is not. As early as the mid-nineteenth century, economists
recognized that value inheres in more than just tangible assets and that
1. This Article defines intellectual capital more precisely below. See infra notes 15-36
and accompanying text.
2. The earliest known usage of the phrase was in 1969 by John Kenneth Galbraith.
Alexander Serenko & Nicholas Bontis, Meta-Review of Knowledge Management and
Intellectual Capital Literature: Citation Impact and Research Productivity Rankings, 11
KNOWLEDGE & PROCESS MGMT. 185, 185 (2004).
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knowledge and innovation are essential components of economic
activity.3
At the same time, intellectual capital has also been likened to dark
matter-the essential substance that binds together the universe but is
not directly observable.4 It has a long history of being undervalued or
excluded from measures of economic productivity and wealth.5 By one
estimate, in recent years as much as one trillion dollars per year of
investments in intellectual capital were omitted from official measures
of gross domestic product (GDP).6
It is only now, well into the twenty-first century, that the ascendance
of intellectual capital has become undeniable.7 Companies such as
Google, Amazon, and Apple exemplify the new business model. Their
most valuable assets are not physical plant and equipment, but rather
operating systems, product designs, organizational structures, and their
reputation among customers.8 A recent trend in Silicon Valley that
highlights the importance of intellectual capital is "acqui-hiring," where
one company buys another solely to obtain the purchased company's
most valuable asset-its employees.9 Another example of the value of
3. Mie Augier & David J. Teece, An Economics Perspective on Intellectual Capital, in
PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 3-4 (Bernard Marr ed., 2005); Bernard Marr, The
Evolution and Convergence of Intellectual Capital as a Theme, in PERSPECTIVES ON
INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL, supra, at 213-14; see also Peter Hill, Tangibles, Intangibles and
Services: A New Taxonomy for the Classification of Output, 32 CANADIAN J. ECON. 426, 428-37
(1999).
4. See Ricardo Hausmann & Federico Sturzenegger, U.S. and Global Imbalances: Can
Dark Matter Prevent a Big Bang? (Nov. 13, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
www.cid.harvard.edu/cidpublications/darkmatter051130.pdf (theorizing that the omission of
valuable assets such as know-how, brand recognition, expertise, and research and development
skews estimates of trade imbalances).
5. See Hill, supra note 3, at 436-37, 445; Leonard Nakamura, Intangibles: What Put the
New in the New Economy?, Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1999, at 3, 4, 6-10 [hereinafter Nakamura,
Intangibles].
6. See Leonard Nakamura, Investing in Intangibles: Is a Trillion Dollars Missing from
GDP?, Bus. REV., Q4 2001, at 27, 36 [hereinafter Nakamura, Investing in Intangibles]; see also
Carol Corrado, Charles Hulten & Daniel Sichel, Intangible Capital and US. Economic Growth,
55 REV. INC. & WEALTH 661, 662, 682 (2009) [hereinafter Corrado et al., Intangible Capital];
Carol Corrado, Charles Hulten & Daniel Sichel, Measuring Capital and Technology: An
Expanded Framework, in MEASURING CAPITAL IN THE NEW ECONOMY 11, 12, 30 (Carol Corrado
et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter Corrado et al., Measuring Capital and Technology].
7. See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., NEW SOURCES OF GROWTH:
KNOWLEDGE-BASED CAPITAL-KEY ANALYSES AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS-SYNTHESIS
REPORT (2013) [hereinafter OECD REPORT] (documenting the global increase in business
investment in intellectual capital and the resulting increasing productivity gains).
8. See id. at 8, 17. Intellectual capital is also dominant in more traditional companies. For
example, the physical assets of Nestle, the world's largest food company, comprise only 13% of
its total value. See id. at 9.
9. John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky, Acqui-hiring, 63 DUKE L.J. 281, 283-84 (2013)
(describing and analyzing the acqui-hiring phenomenon).
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intangible assets is the emergence of big data-the detection of patterns
in large quantities of information-as the next frontier of innovation
and productivity.'
Academic interest in intellectual capital has also surged, and in
recent decades there has been an explosion of research on the subject.
Scholars in economics, finance, accounting, and management theory
have refined their theoretical understanding of intellectual capital and
made significant advancements in their ability to quantify its
contribution to economic productivity."t Moreover, their research has
finally begun to gain broad governmental and institutional recognition.
For example, in 2013, the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) for
the first time included research and development (R&D), as well as
artistic creations such as films, music, and books, in its measures of
national economic productivity and wealth, which added $569 billion to
the size of the U.S. economy. 12 A 2013 report by the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) documented
intellectual capital's ascendance to a global phenomenon and urged
policy reforms in taxation, innovation, entrepreneurship, education,
competition, corporate reporting, and intellectual property in order to
realize fully the potential gains of this key economic driver. 13
This Article aims to bring tax law into the twenty-first century. It is
the first to undertake an analysis and assessment of the taxation of
intellectual capital informed by the recent research and reforms in other
fields including knowledge management, financial accounting, and
national accounting.' 4 The Article finds that tax law, which allows
10. See generally G. Scott Erickson & Helen N. Rothberg, Competitors, Intelligence, and
Big Data, in BIG DATA AND BUSINESS ANALYTICS 103 (Jay Liebowitz ed., 2013) (analyzing how
big data can optimize the development and protection of intangible assets).
11. See infra Part 11.
12. See Peter Coy, The Rise of the Intangible Economy: U.S. GDP Counts R&D, Artistic
Creation, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 18, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2
013-07-18/the-rise-of-the-intangible-economy-u-dot-s-dot-gdp-counts-r-and-d-artistic-creation.
The BEA restated GDP for each year retroactive to 1929, the first year of measurement. Id.
These additions increased the size of the U.S. economy in 2013 by $569 billion, or 3.6%. See
Jared Bernstein & Dean Baker, What is 'Seinfeld' Worth?, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/01/opinion/what-is-seinfeld-worth.html.
13. See OECD REPORT, supra note 7, at 6-7.
14. Several tax scholars have analyzed and critiqued the taxation of intangibles, the most
prolific and influential (as evidenced by recent congressional reform proposals) being Calvin
Johnson. See Calvin H. Johnson, First Do No Harm: The Senate Staff Discussion Draft on Cost
Recovery, 142 TAX NOTES 549 (2014) [hereinafter Johnson, First Do No Harm], available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract-2394912; Calvin H. Johnson, Extend the Life for Acquired
Intangibles to 75 Years, 135 TAx NOTES 1053, 1053-56 (2012) [hereinafter Johnson, Extend the
Life], available at http://www.ssm.com/abstract=-2070101; Calvin H. Johnson, Accurate and
Honest Tax Accounting for Oil and Gas, 125 TAx NOTES 573 (2009), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=-1503574 (discussing the taxation of intangible drilling costs);
Calvin H. Johnson, Capitalize Costs of Software Development, 124 TAx NOTES 603 (2009),
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businesses to deduct most of their investments in self-created
intellectual capital, is fundamentally flawed. This results in the loss of
hundreds of billions of dollars in tax revenue, costly misallocation of
resources, and a grave deviation from the accurate measure of income.
The Article argues that, consistent with the prevailing view in other
disciplines, tax law ought to require capitalization of investments in
self-created intellectual capital. Drawing upon the work of both reform
proponents and their critics, this Article considers whether and to what
extent the advances in other fields can be adapted to the tax system.
Based on this analysis, the Article proposes a simplified approach under
which businesses would capitalize and amortize over five years a broad
array of investments in intellectual capital.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I defines intellectual capital
and addresses some preliminary conceptual issues. Part II then discusses
available at http://www.ssm.com/abstract=-15 16809; Calvin H. Johnson, The Effective Tax Ratio
and the Undertaxation of Intangibles, 121 TAX NOTES 1289 (2008) [hereinafter Johnson,
Undertaxation of Intangibles), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1315477; Calvin H.
Johnson, Destroying the Tax Base: The Proposed INDOPCO Capitalization Regulations, 99
TAX NOTES 1381 (2003) [hereinafter Johnson, Destroying the Tax Base], available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract-=412728; Calvin H. Johnson, Capitalization After the
Government's Big Win in INDOPCO, 63 TAx NOTES 1323 (1994) [hereinafter Johnson, Big
Win], available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/calvinjohnson/63tn1323.htm; Calvin H.
Johnson, The Expenditures Incurred by the Target Corporation in an Acquisitive
Reorganization Are Dividends to the Shareholders: (Pssst, Don't Tell the Supreme Court), 53
TAX NOTES 463, 478 (Oct. 28, 1991) [hereinafter Johnson, Dividends], available at
http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/calvinjohnson/acqreorg.htm; see also Don Fullerton &
Andrew B. Lyon, Tax Neutrality and Intangible Capital, in 2 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 63
(Lawrence H. Summers ed., 1988); Jane G. Gravelle & Jack Taylor, Tax Neutrality and the Tax
Treatment of Purchased Intangibles, 45 NAT'L TAX J. 77 (1992); John W. Lee, Transaction
Costs Relating to Acquisition or Enhancement of Intangible Property: A Populist, Political, but
Practical Perspective, 22 VA. TAX REv. 273, 276-77, 311-20 (2002) [hereinafter Lee,
Transaction Costs]; John Lee et al., Restating Capitalization Standards and Rules: The Case for
Rough Justice Regulations (Part One), 23 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 631 (1997) [hereinafter Lee et al.,
Rough Justice (Part One)]; John Lee et al., Restating Capitalization Standards and Rules: The
Case for Rough Justice Regulations (Part Two), 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1483 (1997) [hereinafter
Lee et al., Rough Justice (Part Two)]; George Mundstock, Taxation of Business Intangible
Capital, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1179 (1987); Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Equity and
Efficiency in Intellectual Property Taxation, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (2010); David A. Weisbach,
Measurement and Tax Depreciation Policy: The Case of Short-Term Intangibles, 33 J. LEGAL
STUD. 199 (2004); Ethan Yale, The Final INDOPCO Regulations, 105 TAx NoTEs 435 (2004)
[hereinafter Yale, INDOPCO Regulations]; Ethan Yale, When Are Capitalization Exceptions
Justified?, 57 TAX L. REv. 549 (2004) [hereinafter Yale, Capitalization Exceptions]; Timothy E.
Johns, Note, Tax Treatment of the Costs of Internally Developed Intangible Assets, 57 S. CAL. L.
REv. 767 (1984); Glenn Walberg, Note, Everything Old Is New Again: Reaching the Limits of
INDOPCO 's Future Benefits with the Just-in-Time Management Philosophy, 38 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 1257 (1997).
This Article contributes to the literature by building on the work of many of these scholars
and by, for the first time, drawing extensively upon research in other fields to assess and
propose reforms for the tax treatment of intellectual capital.
2233
research and reforms in three fields of particular relevance to the
taxation of intellectual capital: knowledge management, financial
accounting, and national accounting. Part III analyzes the current tax
law treatment of intellectual capital. Finally, Part IV, drawing upon the
research from the other fields discussed in Part II, proposes reforms in
the taxation of intellectual capital.
I. INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: DEFINITION AND PRELIMINARY
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
Intellectual capital is not easy to define. In keeping with its
comparison to "dark matter,"'1 5 scholars sometimes define it by what it
is not: "[T]he defining characteristics of [intellectual] capital can be
most tersely described by what it is not-not physical (plant and
equipment), and not financial (stocks, bonds, and other similar
instruments)."' 6
Despite the difficulty of precisely defining intellectual capital, the
concept is easy to grasp intuitively, and its many definitions are similar
at their core. For example, Professor Baruch Lev defines intellectual
capital (or intangibles, in his terminology) as "nonphysical sources of
value (claims to future benefits) generated by innovation (discovery),
unique organizational designs, or human resources practices."17 Lev
cites Merck's pharmaceutical advances as an example of discovery,
Cisco's internet-based product installation and maintenance system as
an example of unique organizational design, and Xerox's information-
sharing system for employees as an example of human resources.18 Lev
notes that a combination of these sources can produce intellectual
capital: for example, the valuable brand Coke combines innovation (the
secret Coke formula) and organizational structure (exceptional
marketing savvy).' 9
Similar to Lev, Professor Margaret Blair and co-author Steven
Wallman define intellectual capital (intangibles, in their terminology as
well) as "nonphysical factors that contribute to, or are used in, the
production of goods or the provision of services or that are expected to
generate future productive benefits to the individuals or firms that
control their use."2° Blair and Wallman emphasize what they call
15. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
16. Carol A. Robbins, Mary L. Streitwieser & William A. Jolliff, R&D and Other
Intangible Assets in an Input-Output Framework: Experimental Estimates with U.S. Data 3
(BEA, Working Paper No. 0065, 2010), available at http://www.bea.gov/papers/pdf/rnd_
intangibles io 2010.pdf.
17. BARUCH LEV, INTANGIBLES: MANAGEMENT, MEASUREMENT, AND REPORTING 7 (2001).
18. Id. at6.
19. See id.
20. MARGARET M. BLAIR & STEVEN M. H. WALLMAN, UNSEEN WEALTH: REPORT OF THE
BROOKINGS TASK FORCE ON INTANGIBLES 9-10 (2001).
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"intangible inputs" into the economy: "the ideas, special skills,
organizational structures and capabilities, brand identities, mailing lists
and data bases, and the networks of social, professional, and business
relationships that make it possible for hundreds of millions of people to
exchange services, experiences, technology, and ideas.'
In their survey of numerous definitions of intellectual capital,
Professors Leandro Caflibano, Manuel Garcia-Ayuso Covarsi, and M.
Paloma Sdinchez find most definitions agree that intellectual capital
refers to "sources of probable future economic profits, lacking physical
substance, which are controlled by a firm as a result of previous events
or transactions (self-production, purchase or any other means of
acquisition). 22 Despite the similarities among definitions, Cafiibano,
Garcia-Ayuso Covarsi, and Sdinchez find that "there does not appear to
be a generally accepted definition or classification of intangibles. 23
Thus, they call for the development of a unified definition of
intangibles.24 In contrast, Bernard Marr argues that the definition of
intellectual capital can and should differ depending on the context and
purposes for which it is being defined.25 This Article adopts Cafiibano,
Garcia-Ayuso Covarsi, and Sdnchez's broad definition of intellectual
capital, but acknowledges Marr's point that the definition is not precise
and may vary depending on the context. To provide clarity, the Article
highlights throughout where definitional ambiguities arise. To forestall
potential confusion, the following paragraphs address a few conceptual
issues related to the definition of intellectual capital.
First, regarding terminology, intellectual capital is sometimes called
knowledge-based capital26 or, alternatively, intangibles or intangible
assets.27 This latter term may be misleading because it suggests that
only separable, identifiable, and legally protected assets can "count" as
intellectual capital.28 Scholars generally define intellectual capital more
broadly than that to encompass not only legally protected intellectual
property such as patents, trademarks, and copyrights, but also
information systems, administrative structures and processes, market
21. Id. at 9.
22. Leandro Caflibano, Manuel Garcia-Ayuso Covarsi & M. Paloma Sdnchez, The Value
Relevance and Managerial Implications of Intangibles: A Literature Review 14 (Mar. 1999)
[hereinafter Cafiibano et al., The Value], http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/1947974.pdf.
23. Id. at 19.
24. See id. at 14, 55.
25. See Bernard Marr, Introduction, in PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL, supra
note 3, at xiii-xv.
26. See, e.g., OECD REPORT, supra note 7, at 6, 12.
27. See, e.g., LEV, supra note 17, at 5.
28. To add to the confusion, the term "intellectual capital" is sometimes used to describe
the subset of "intangibles" consisting of intellectual property, trade secrets, and computer
software. See Cafiibano et al., The Value, supra note 22, at 16 fig.2. This Article does not adopt
this narrower meaning of "intellectual capital."
and technical knowledge, brands, trade secrets, organizational know-
how, culture, strategic capabilities, and customer satisfaction.
2 9
Examples of this broader definition of intellectual capital include Wal-
Mart's computerized supply chain, Amazon's customer service
reputation, and Google's unique business model.3 °
Second, intellectual capital can be observed and measured by
reference to either inputs or outputs.3 Inputs focus on resources
expended to develop intellectual capital and include expenditures such
as R&D, advertising, strategic planning, and worker training. Outputs
focus on the end result of the inputs. For example, patents and
copyrights are outputs that are the product of R&D inputs, and brands
are the outputs of advertising inputs. Businesses can acquire outputs
from third parties or produce them internally. On the output side, it is
sometimes difficult to identify the specific assets created, and as
discussed below, financial and tax accounting systems sometimes
designate nonspecific intellectual capital as goodwill.32
A third important conceptual distinction exists between intellectual
capital acquired from third parties and self-created intellectual capital.
As this Article shows, this distinction is highly significant in the realms
of management, accounting, and tax law.33 In all of these fields, most of
the problems identified and reforms proposed relate to self-created
intellectual capital.34
A final conceptual issue concerns the relationship between
intellectual capital, on one hand, and labor and human capital on the
other. Inputs into intellectual capital often consist largely, or even
exclusively, of labor. For example, strategic planning requires primarily
the time and effort of managers. Similarly, scientific R&D requires
primarily the time and effort of scientists. However, scientific R&D also
requires expenditures for labs and equipment. Moreover, labor
expenditures do not always produce intellectual capital because they do
not always produce future benefits. For example, a fast food server or
an office receptionist serves the current needs of their employer, but
their services do not contribute to the employer's future profits.
29. See Farok J. Contractor, Intangible Assets and Principles for Their Valuation, in
VALUATION OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS IN GLOBAL OPERATIONS 3, 7 fig. 1.1, 8 (Farok J. Contractor
ed., 2001); JUERGEN H. DAUM, INTANGIBLE ASSETS AND VALUE CREATION 17 (2003); LEV, supra
note 17, at 5-7.
30. See OECD REPORT, supra note 7, at 8, 17.
31. See Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 6, at 663-66. The literature does not
always distinguish precisely between inputs and outputs. For example, Blair and Wallman
describe brands and mailing lists as "intangible inputs" into the economy. See BLAIR &
WALLMAN, supra note 20, at 9. These are more properly characterized as outputs.
32. See infra notes 71-73, 181 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., infra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
34. See infra Part IV.
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Alternatively, labor expenditures sometimes produce future benefits
involving tangible assets, when, for example, workers help in the
construction of a new factory.
Intellectual capital and human capital are closely related but not
coterminous. Broadly speaking, human capital refers to resources in
people or human capabilities that produce future monetary and psychic
income.3" While intellectual capital focuses on businesses' investment
in and production of intangible sources of future value, human capital
focuses on individuals' possession of and investment in their own
capabilities to produce future value. Like intellectual capital, human
capital can be observed and measured by reference to inputs and
outputs. The inputs to human capital include formal education, on-the-
job training, healthcare, and migration.36 Scholars typically measure the
outputs of human capital by reference to individuals' increased income
resulting from investments in education, healthcare, and the like.
37
This Article is concerned primarily with the treatment of business
investment in intellectual capital.38 Thus, for example, the Article
argues that the tax system should treat on-the-job training costs as
enhancing the business's intellectual capital, but it does not address how
the employees should treat this enhancement of their own human
capital. However, much of the analysis developed in this Article has
35. See GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 11, 15-16 (3d ed. 1993).
The term "human capital" also suffers from its own definitional ambiguities, which make it
difficult to distinguish precisely from intellectual capital. Some scholars use the term "human
capital" in a narrower sense to refer to a subset of intellectual capital that includes employee
knowledge, capabilities, and experience. See Ulf Johanson, A Human Resource Perspective on
Intellectual Capital, in PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL, supra note 3, at 96-97; Robin
Kramar, Vijaya Murthy & James Guthrie, Accounting for Human Capital and Organizational
Effectiveness, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF HUMAN CAPITAL 382, 384 (Alan Burton-Jones &
J.-C. Spender eds., 2011). In addition, some definitions of intellectual capital focus more on its
human resource aspects and include values such as empathy, persistence, and competitiveness.
See Robbins et al., supra note 16, at 3-4.
36. Theodore W. Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, 51 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 9-13
(1961); see also Robbins et al., supra note 16, at 3-4.
37. See generally BECKER, supra note 35, at 147-200 (providing an empirical analysis of
the effect of college education on earnings and productivity); Dale W. Jorgenson & Barbara M.
Fraumeni, The Accumulation of Human and Nonhuman Capital, 1948-84, in THE
MEASUREMENT OF SAVING, INVESTMENT, AND WEALTH 227 (Robert E. Lipsey & Helen Stone
Tice eds., 1989) (estimating, inter alia, the effect of education on lifetime labor income).
38. This Article does not address the tax treatment of income derived from intellectual
capital, one of the principal concerns of which is the manipulation of international streams of
income through transfer pricing and other avoidance strategies. See, e.g., Yariv Brauner, Value
in the Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation of Intangibles for Transfer Pricing Purposes, 28 VA.
TAx REV. 79 (2008); Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation,
International Competition, and the Challenges of International Taxation, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
347 (2013); Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699 (2011).
implications for the taxation of human capital, which this author
addresses elsewhere.
39
II. INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL RESEARCH, FINDINGS, AND REFORMS
This Part describes some of the research and reforms related to
intellectual capital in the fields of knowledge management, financial
accounting, and national accounting. The purpose of this discussion is
twofold. First, it demonstrates that scholars now widely acknowledge
intellectual capital as an important driver of economic growth that has
been overlooked until recently. Second, as is developed in Part IV, the
areas discussed in this Part have particular relevance to the tax treatment
of intellectual capital.
A. Knowledge Management
Managers engage in ceaseless efforts to understand and exploit a
business's resources and capabilities to create value and maximize the
profits of their business. 4' Scholars had been arguing that intellectual
capital resources were a vital but overlooked driver of value creation for
decades4' when, in 1991, Thomas Stewart's article in Foriune
introduced the concept of intellectual capital to the mainstream U.S.
business community.42  Stewart highlighted the importance of
intellectual capital and popularized the idea of "knowledge
management" as part of corporate strategy:
Every company depends increasingly on knowledge-
patents, processes, management skills, technologies,
39. See generally Mary Louise Fellows & Lily Kahng, Costly Mistakes: Undertaxed
Business Owners and Overtaxed Workers, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 329 (2013) (discussing the
lack of available deductions for employee consumption and the under-taxation of employer
expenditures); Lily Kahng, Intellectual Capital and Human Capital Perspectives on the Taxation
of Education and Training (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
40. See generally Michael E. Porter, What Is Strategy?, HARv. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec.
1996, at 61 (discussing business strategy); David J. Teece, Gary Pisano & Amy Shuen, Dynamic
Capabilities and Strategic Management, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 509 (1997) (discussing how
the "dynamic capabilities approach" can help answer the "fundamental question" of "how firms
achieve and sustain competitive advantage").
41. See generally Leire Alcaniz et al., Theoretical Perspectives on Intellectual Capital: A
Backward Look and a Proposal for Going Forward, 35 ACCT. FORUM 104 (2011); Leandro
Cafibano et al., Accounting for Intangibles: A Literature Review, 19 J. ACCT. LITERATURE 102
(2000).
42. See Thomas A. Stewart, BrainPower: Intellectual Capital Is Becoming Corporate
America's Most Valuable Asset and Can Be Its Sharpest Competitive Weapon, FORTUNE, June 3,
1991, available at http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/1 991/06/03/
75096/index.htm; see also THOMAS A. STEWART, INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: THE NEW WEALTH OF
ORGANIZATIONS (1997); Thomas A. Stewart, Your Company's Most Valuable Asset: Intellectual
Capital, FORTUNE, Oct. 3, 1994 [hereinafter Stewart, Most Valuable Asset],
http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/1994/10/03/79803/index.htm.
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information about customers and suppliers, and old-
fashioned experience. Added together, this knowledge is
intellectual capital.... [I]t's the sum of everything
everybody in your company knows that gives you u
competitive edge in the marketplace. Such collective
knowledge is hard to identify and harder still to deploy
effectively. But once you find it and exploit it, you win. 3
Since then, catalyzed by the technology boom of the 1990s and the
growth of the "knowledge economy," 44  research on knowledge
management has exploded, and knowledge management consulting is
now a thriving industry.45 The business community widely accepts the
importance of intellectual capital in value creation, and businesses have
implemented internal systems to identify it, monitor its productivity,
and allocate resources toward its development.46
Two of the best known systems for identifying and quantifying
intellectual capital are the Skandia Navigator, developed by Leif
Edvinsson,47 and the Balanced Scorecard, developed by Robert Kaplan
43. Stewart, Most Valuable Asset, supra note 42.
44. Peter Drucker first used the term "knowledge economy" in 1969 to describe the shift
in the U.S. economy from manufacturing to services and technology. See PETER F. DRUCKER,
THE AGE OF DISCONTINUITY: GUIDELINES TO OUR CHANGING SOCIETY 263-86 (1969).
45. For influential and pathbreaking books on knowledge management, see generally, for
example, THOMAS H. DAVENPORT & LAURENCE PRUSAK, WORKING KNOWLEDGE: How
ORGANIZATIONS MANAGE WHAT THEY KNOW (1998); IKUJIRo NONAKA & HIROTAKA TAKEUCHI,
THE KNOWLEDGE-CREATING COMPANY: How JAPANESE COMPANIES CREATE THE DYNAMICS OF
INNOVATION (1995); KARL ERIK SVEtIBY, THE NEW ORGANIZATIONAL WEALTH: MANAGING AND
MEASURING KNOWLEDGE-BASED ASSETS (1997). The vast literature on intellectual capital and
knowledge management is evidenced by several journals dedicated to the subject, including the
Journal of Intellectual Capital, the Journal of Knowledge Management, and Knowledge and
Process Management. In addition, there are innumerable books, articles, and reports on the
subject.
46. See Alcaniz et al., supra note 41, at 106-13; Daniel Andriessen, IC Valuation and
Measurement: Classifying the State of the Art, 5 J. INTELL. CAP. 230 (2004) (developing,
clarifying, and classifying methods for measuring and valuing intellectual capital); Nick Bontis,
Assessing Knowledge Assets: A Review of the Models Used to Measure Intellectual Capital, 3
INT'L J. MGMT. REVS. 41, 44-56 (2001) (describing knowledge management systems including
the Skandia Navigator, the IC-Index, Technology Broker's IC Audit, Sveiby's intangible asset
monitor, and Stem Stewart's Economic Value Added); Leif Edvinsson & Patrick Sullivan,
Developing a Model for Managing Intellectual Capital, 14 EUR. MGMT. J. 356 (1996)
(describing management systems of several companies); Jolanta Jurczak, Intellectual Capital
Measurement Methods, 1 ECON. & ORG. ENTERPRISE 37 (2008) (describing twenty-one
methodologies for measuring intellectual capital, grouped into four categories: direct intellectual
capital methods, market capitalization methods, return-on-assets methods, and scorecard
methods); Baruch Lev & Juergen H. Daum, The Dominance of Intangible Assets: Consequences
for Enterprise Management and Corporate Reporting, 8 MEASURING BUS. EXCELLENCE 6 (2004)
(discussing methods that can be used to manage and understand intangibles).
47. See Leif Edvinsson, Developing Intellectual Capital at Skandia, 30 LONG RANGE
PLAN. 366 (1997) (describing the creation process and reasoning behind the Skandia Navigator);
2240 FLORIDA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 66
and Professor David Norton. 48 The Navigator identifies two components
of intellectual capital: (1) human capital, defined as the aggregate of
employees' knowledge, skill, and innovativeness and (2) structural
capital, defined as software, databases, organizational structure, patents,
customer relationships, and other organizational capabilities that enable
employees to be productive.49 Skandia first implemented the Navigator
for internal managerial purposes in 1985 and incorporated it into the
company's financial reports to shareholders in 1994, becoming the first
to include an intellectual capital supplement to its financial reports. °
Many other companies since then, including Dow Chemical, have relied
upon the Skandia framework to formulate intellectual capital
supplements to their financial reports.5
The Balanced Scorecard articulates four perspectives that inform the
formulation and execution of a strategic plan: (1) the leaming and
growth perspective; (2) the business-process perspective; (3) the
customer perspective; and (4) the financial perspective.5 2 According to
Kaplan and Norton, the first three perspectives in particular enable
businesses to formulate a strategy to "create future value through
investment in customers, suppliers, employees, processes, technology,
and innovation. 53 Early adopters of the Balanced Scorecard included
Mobil, Chemical Bank, AT&T Canada, and Wells Fargo Online
Services. 4 Thousands of organizations worldwide have since adopted
the Balanced Scorecard. 55
Researchers and corporate managers agree widely that knowledge
management systems can enhance the performance and profitability of
businesses. 56 However, there are numerous different models and
frameworks for measuring intellectual capital 5V-one recent survey
LEIF EDVINSSON & MICHAEL S. MALONE, INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: REALIZING YOUR COMPANY'S
TRUE VALUE BY FINDING ITS HIDDEN BRAINPOWER (1997) (explaining the workings of the
measure of intellectual capital and detailing the process for creation of the Skandia Navigator);
see also J. Mouritsen, H. T. Larsen & P. N. Bukh, Valuing the Future: intellectual Capital
Supplements at Skandia, 14 ACCT., AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 399, 399-400 (2001).
48. ROBERT S. KAPLAN & DAVID P. NORTON, THE BALANCED SCORECARD: TRANSLATING
STRATEGY INTO ACTION (1996); Robert S. Kaplan & David P. Norton, The Balanced
Scorecard-Measures That Drive Performance, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 71.
49. See EDVINSSON & MALONE, supra note 47, at 11.
50. Bontis, supra note 46, at 44.
51. Id.
52. See KAPLAN & NORTON, supra note 48, at 72-77.
53. Id. at 7.
54. Robert S. Kaplan, Conceptual Foundations of the Balanced Scorecard, in 3
HANDBOOK OF MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 1253, 1267 (Christopher S. Chapman,
Anthony G. Hopwood & Michael D. Shields eds., 2009).
55. Id. at 1253.
56. Lev & Daum, supra note 46, at 6; see also Alcaniz et al., supra note 41, at 106, 110.
57. See DANIEL ANDRIESSEN, MAKING SENSE OF INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: DESIGNING A
METHOD FOR THE VALUATION OF INTANGIBLES 13-14 (2004) (describing four methods of
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describes twenty-one different methodologies 58-and no consensus has
emerged about which model or framework is best. 59 Managers still do
not fully understand intellectual capital resources and how best to
deploy them.60 Researchers continue to disagree about the best way to
measure and assess the impact of intellectual capital on business
performance, in particular whether to use a qualitative approach, as
exemplified by the Skandia Navigator and the Balanced Scorecard, or a
quantitative approach that uses finance metrics, such as earnings per
share and market-to-book ratio.
61
B. Financial Accounting
Financial accounting refers to the process by which a business
creates its financial reports or statements-principally the balance sheet
and income statement-to provide information to its investors,
shareholders, creditors, employees, and other stakeholders. 62 Financial
accounting is distinct from managerial or management accounting. The
latter refers to the internal books that businesses keep to assess
performance and strategize for the future, although there may be
substantial overlap between the two categories. 63 For example, Skandia
first implemented its Navigator for internal purposes but later
incorporated the information into its financial reports in the form of an
intellectual capital supplement.64
The guidelines for financial accounting, called generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP), are "a set of objectives, conventions,
and principles that have evolved over the years to govern the
preparation and presentation of financial statements." 65 The most
important authoritative sources of GAAP are statements of the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB).66 Other authoritative sources
include releases and bulletins of the American Institute of Certified
intangible asset valuation).
58. See Jurczak, supra note 46, at 41-44.
59. Id. at 44-45.
60. See Alcaniz et al., supra note 41, at 110-11.
61. See id at 111-13. Professor Alcaniz and her coauthors identify three types of systems
for measuring and reporting intellectual capital: "hard number metrics; scoreboards populated
by sets of softer indicators; and narrative accounts." Id. at 112.
62. See generally WILLIAM G. DROMS & JAY 0. WRIGHT, FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING FOR
NONFINANCIAL MANAGERS: ALL THE BASICS You NEED TO KNOW 27-66 (6th ed. 2010)
(providing an overview of financial accounting).
63. See generally STEPHAN LEITNER, INFORMATION QUALITY AND MANAGEMENT
ACCOUNTING: A SIMULATION ANALYSIS OF BIASES IN COSTING SYSTEMS 11-27 (2012)
(describing the functions of and principles underlying management accounting and financial
accounting).
64. See supra text accompanying note 50.
65. DROMS & WRIGHT, supra note 62, at 27.
66. See id. at 28.
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Public Accountants (AICPA) and releases of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).67
1. Current Treatment of Intellectual Capital
Under current GAAP, financial accounting for intellectual capital
distinguishes between intellectual capital acquired from third parties
and self-created intellectual capital. Where intellectual capital is
acquired from a third party, it must be capitalized-that is, the buyer
must record it as an asset on the business's balance sheet and amortize
that capital over its useful life.68 Where a business acquires a specific
intangible asset, the buyer records that asset at its cost on the balance
sheet.69 In cases where a buyer acquires an entire business, the buyer
must allocate the purchase price among specific assets in order to
capitalize the cost of each asset.7 ° The general approach is to allocate
the purchase price first to specific and identifiable assets in accordance
with their relative fair market values, and then to allocate any residual
purchase price to goodwill.7 Goodwill is deemed to have an indefinite
life and, therefore, it is not amortized over any fixed period.72 Instead,
businesses must make an annual assessment to determine whether
goodwill has been impaired and expense the amount, if any, of such
impairment.73
67. See id. at 29.
68. See BUSINESS COMBINATIONS, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 141, 7 5-
8, at 9-10 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2001) [hereinafter Statement of FAS No. 141],
available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fasl41.pdf; GOODWILL AND OTHER INTANGIBLE ASSETS,
Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 142, 17 9, 11, at 10 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd.
2001) [hereinafter Statement of FAS No. 142], available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas142.pdf;
see also Benjamin P. Foster et al., Valuing Intangible Assets, CPA J. (Oct. 3, 2003),
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajoumal/2003/1003/features/fl05003.htm; Ronald J. Huefner &
James A. Largay III, The Effect of the New Goodwill Accounting Rules on Financial Statements,
CPA J. (Oct. 4, 2004), http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajoumal/2004/1004/essentials/p30.htm;
Jennifer M. Mueller, Amortization of Certain Intangible Assets, J. ACCT. (Dec. 2004),
http://www.joumalofaccountancy.com/issues/2004/dec/amortizationofcertainintangibleassets.htm.
69. See Mueller, supra note 68.
70. See Statement of FAS No. 141, supra note 68, 9, 13-14, 20, 22, at 10-13.
71. See id. % 5, 8, 43, at 9-10, 18. To be treated separately from goodwill, an intangible
asset must be legally or contractually protected or separable and capable of being monetized.
See id. A 10, at 26 (providing a list of intangibles that may be treated separately).
72. See Statement of FAS No. 142, supra note 68, 77 16, 18, at 12.
73. See id. 18, 20, at 12-13; see also Huefner & Largay, supra note 68.
Prior to 2001, financial accounting distinguished between acquisitions where the sole or
primary consideration was equity of the acquiring entity ("equity-based acquisitions") and those
where the sole or primary consideration was cash or other property ("non-equity-based
acquisitions"). See BUSINESS COMBINATIONS, Opinion No. 16, 15 (Accounting Principles Bd.
1970). Equity-based acquisitions were treated under "pooling" accounting and non-equity-based
acquisitions were treated under "purchase" accounting. See id. 77 12, 15. In pooling accounting,
assets were reported at historic values on the acquiring company's financial statements. See
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Where intellectual capital is self-created, it generally must be
expensed-that is, the business must record expenditures for its
development on its income statement.74 There are a few exceptions to
the expensing of self-created intellectual capital-the most notable of
which relates to computer software.75 Businesses that develop computer
software for sale or lease to others must capitalize and amortize the
software over its useful life.76 However, there is some flexibility in the
guidelines, and many software companies choose to expense rather than
capitalize a substantial portion of their expenditures.77
In general, international accounting standards treat intellectual
capital similarly to GAAP: Most acquired intellectual capital is
capitalized, and most self-created intellectual capital is expensed.78
Notably, international accounting standards diverge from GAAP in that
they require businesses to capitalize rather than expense self-created
R&D.79
Christine Andrews et al., SFAS 141(R): Global Convergence and Massive Changes in M&A
Accounting, 7 J. Bus. ECON. RES. 125, 125 (2009). Under purchase accounting, assets were
reported at their cost. Id; Stephen R. Moehrle & Jennifer A. Reynolds-Moehrle, Say Good-Bye
to Pooling and Goodwill Amortization, J. ACCT. (Sept. 2001), http://www.joumalofaccountancy.
com/Issues/2001/Sep/SayGoodByeToPoolingAndGoodwillAmortization.htm. In 2001, the
FASB eliminated pooling accounting in its Statement No. 141. See Statement of FAS No. 141,
supra note 68, 9 59, at 22. At the same time, the FASB issued its Statement Number 142, which
changed the treatment of goodwill. See Statement of FAS No. 142, supra note 68, at 7.
74. LEV, supra note 17, at 91-92; Philip Siegel & Carl Borgia, The Measurement and
Recognition of Intangible Assets, 1 J. Bus. & PUB. AFF. (2007), available at
http://www.scientificjournals.org/journals2007/articles/1006.htm. No overarching FASB rule
relating to all self-created intellectual capital exists, but rather an assortment of guidance, some
of a general nature and some relating to specific types of investments such as advertising, R&D,
customer relations, and motion pictures. See Statement of FAS No. 141, supra note 68, A14,
B21 1, at 28-29, 86; LEV, supra note 17, at 135-50; see also Ernst & Young, Intangibles-
Goodwill and Other, FIN. REPORTING DEV. (2013), available at http://www.ey.com/publicationl
vwluassetsdld/financialreportingdevelopments bbl499intangibles_9july2l4/$file/financialrep
ortingdevelopments bb1499_intangibles_9july2014.pdf.
75. See LEV, supra note 17, at 91.
76. See ACCOUNTING FOR THE COSTS OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE TO BE SOLD, LEASED, OR
OTHERWISE MARKETED, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 86 9 2-4, 7, at 5-6 (Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. 1985), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas86.pdf.
77. See David Aboody & Baruch Lev, The Value Relevance of Intangibles: The Case of
Software Capitalization, 36 J. ACCT. RES. 161, 167-68 (1998).
78. See ERNST & YOUNG, US GAAP VERSUS IFRS: THE BASICS 17 (2012),
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/US_GAAPversusIFRS:_The_basicsNovember_2
012/$FILE/USGAAP v IFRS TheBasicsNov2012.pdf; GRANT THORNTON, COMPARISON
BETWEEN U.S. GAAP AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS 39-42 (2013),
http://www.grantthomton.com.au/files/gt_2013_comparison-us ifrs.pdf.
79. See INTANGIBLE ASSETS, International Accounting Standard No. 38 (Int'l Accounting
Standards Bd. 2004) [hereinafter IAS Standards No. 38], available at
http://www.ifrs.org/IFRSs/IFRS-technical-summaries/Documents/English%2OWeb%20Summar
ies%202013/IAS%2038.pdf
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2. Research and Reforms
Financial accounting scholars argue that current accounting
guidelines fail to provide accurate and complete information about the
value of self-created intellectual capital to investors and other
stakeholders. This failure can have many adverse consequences. For
example, scholars often cite the expensing of self-created R&D to
explain why the earnings and assets of companies, such as
pharmaceutical manufacturers, seem very low relative to their stock
prices. 80 They argue that the expensing of self-created R&D depresses
the earnings of these companies and that the failure to capitalize self-
created R&D undervalues the assets of these companies. 81 These
accounting distortions undermine the reliability of financial statements
vis-d-vis the true value of a company-they lower the "value-relevance"
of financial statements.
82
Reform proponents argue that this loss in value relevance has many
undesirable consequences including higher costs of capital, a systematic
undervaluation of intangible assets, an increased risk of insider trading,
and a degraded usefulness of financial reports. 83 A substantial and
growing literature provides empirical support for these claims.
84
Lev and Professor Paul Zarowin argue that the "almost universal
expensing of intangible investments" is inconsistent with the FASB's
conceptual definition of an asset as "probable future economic benefit
obtained or controlled by a particular entity as a result of past
transactions or events.. . whether tangible or intangible and whether or
80. See Nakamura, Investing in Intangibles, supra note 6, at 30-31; Charles Hulten,
Accounting for the Knowledge Economy 7-10 (The Conference Bd. Econ. Program Working
Paper No. 08-13, Jan. 2008), http://www.conference-board.org/pdffree/workingpapers/E-0040-
08-WP.pdf; see also William Hubbard, The Debilitating Effect of Exclusive Rights: Patents and
Productive Inefficiency, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2045, 2046-47 (2014) (discussing other oddities in the
pharmaceutical industry).
81. See Nakamura, Intangibles, supra note 5, at 8-10; Hulten, supra note 80, at 7-10.
82. See Nils E. Joachim Hoegh-Krohn & Kjell Henry KnivsflA, Accounting for Intangible
Assets in Scandinavia, the UK, the US, and by the IASC: Challenges and a Solution, 35 INT'L J.
ACCT. 243,255-56 (2000).
83. See Caflibano et al., The Value, supra note 22, at 38-39; see also Hoegh-Krohn &
Knivsfl&, supra note 82, at 254-56; WAYNE S. UPTON, JR., FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD.,
SPECIAL REPORT: BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL REPORTING, CHALLENGES FROM THE NEW ECONOMY
84-86 (2001), http://www.fasb.org/articles&reports/sr-new-economy.pdf.
84. See, e.g., Baruch Lev & Paul Zarowin, The Boundaries of Financial Reporting and
How to Extend Them, 37 J. ACCT. REs. 353, 378-79 (1999) (surveying empirical literature on
intellectual capital and capital markets); Douglas J. Skinner et al., Implications of Accounting
Research for the FASB's Initiatives on Disclosure of Information About Intangible Assets, 17 J.
ACCT. HORIZONS 175 (2003) (same); Masayuki Morikawa, Financial Constraints in Intangible
Investments: Evidence from Japanese Firms (Research Inst. of Econ., Trade & Indus.
Discussion Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-E-045, 2012) (same).
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not it has a market price or is otherwise exchangeable."85 Lev and
Zarowin propose the capitalization of all self-created intangible
investments once they have met a prespecified "technological feasibility
test, such as a working model for software or a clinical test for a
drug."86 Under Lev and Zarowin's proposal, capitalized intangibles
would then be amortized in accordance with "management's estimates
of productive lives, guided by industry norms and research findings,"
and subject to a period impairment test to "safeguard against
overvaluation."87
Lev and Zarowin further propose that businesses should
systematically restate their financial statements to account for events,
such as a corporate restructuring, that involve intellectual capital
investments in employee training, reorganization of business lines, and
the acquisition of technology.88 Under GAAP, businesses immediately
expense these outlays; Lev and Zarowin propose instead to restate
current and past financial statements-to reverse the expensing of these
investments and instead to capitalize them-as the benefits of the
restructuring materialize.
89
Many scholars disagree with Lev and Zarowin's position that
capitalization of self-created intellectual capital is the appropriate
remedy for deficiencies in financial accounting. They argue in
opposition that the benefits of intellectual capital investments are too
uncertain to warrant including them on the balance sheet, that
nonfinancial disclosure is a more suitable means to provide information,
and that capitalization would enable managers to engage in "earnings
management"--that is, to overstate or otherwise distort their results. 90
85. Lev & Zarowin, supra note 84, at 376-77 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
ELEMENTS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, Statement of Fin. Accounting Concepts No. 6, 25,
173, at 16, 55 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1985) (footnote omitted)).
86. See id. at 377.
87. See id. at 379. Their proposal is similar to the treatment of R&D under International
Financial Accounting Standards (IFRS), which require the capitalization of development costs
once certain technical feasibility and other tests are met. See IAS Standards No. 38, supra note
79; see also BDO, IFRS AT A GLANCE: IAS 38 INTANGIBLE ASSETS (2014),
http://www.bdointemational.com/Services/Audit/FRS/IFRS%20at%2a%2a Gance/Documents
/IAS%2038.pdf.
88. Lev & Zarowin, supra note 84, at 380.
89. See id.
90. See, e.g., BLAIR & WALLMAN, supra note 20, at 66-67 (arguing that the debate about
whether to expense or capitalize R&D focuses on the wrong problem; what is important is that
the information be provided to investors, regardless of the format, and that capitalization is in
fact "a poor proxy for ... richer information disclosure"); UPTON, supra note 83, at 101-02
(identifying several objections to capitalization including cost and benefit, lack of relevance,
measurement difficulty, competitive harms, and volatility); Alcaniz et al., supra note 41, at 112-
15 (describing the narrative and critical accounting approaches to reporting intellectual capital
and noting that quantitative measures often disadvantage workers); Kramar et al., supra note 35,
at 393-95 (arguing that quantitative approaches to reporting financial capital are inadequate and
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Moreover, the FASB has not adopted Lev and Zarowin's proposals. 9'
However, in 2002, in response to calls to reform financial reporting of
intellectual capital, the FASB began a research project to study whether
it should require additional qualitative and quantitative disclosure about
self-created intangible assets.92 The project languished, and in 2004, the
FASB withdrew it from its research agenda.93 The FASB renewed its
interest in intellectual capital in 2007 and considered whether to
undertake a joint project with the International Accounting Standards
Board (IASB) to expand disclosure guidelines for intangibles. 94 Both
the FASB and the IASB acknowledged the importance of the project but
must be broadened to include non-financial indicators through the use of narratives); Skinner et
al., supra note 84, at 183 (reviewing empirical research and concluding that the FASB should
proceed with caution in considering whether to require capitalization of self-created intangibles,
given the lack of definitive research and in light of concerns about valuing the uncertain future
benefits of such intangibles); see also Steven H. Penman, Accounting for Intangible Assets:
There Is Also an Income Statement, 45 ABACUS 358 (2009) (positing that intangibles do not
necessarily need to be reflected on a company's balance sheet because their value can be
derived from the income statement). But see Hoegh-Krohn & KnivsflA, supra note 82, at 258-62
(endorsing Lev and Zarovin's proposals).
91. As discussed above, the FASB requires R&D to be expensed. However, since 1972,
the FASB and the SEC have required mandatory disclosure of R&D expenditures. Paul E. Nix
& David E. Nix, A Historical Review of the Accounting Treatment of Research and
Development Costs, 19 ACCT. HIST. J. 51, 61 (1992).
92. Skinner et al., supra note 84; see also FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., PROPOSAL
FOR NEW RESEARCH PROJECT: DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ABOUT INTANGIBLE ASSETS NOT
RECOGNIZED IN FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (2001), http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=
urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=l 175819439149&blobheader=applic
ation%2Fpdf.
93. See Project Updates: Disclosures About Intangible Assets, FASB (May 21, 2004),
http://www.fasb.org/intangibles.shtml. Events of the early twenty-first century including Enron,
the bursting of the dot-corn stock bubble, and the economic downturn precipitated by the events
of September 11, 2001, likely influenced the FASB's decision to abandon its project. As a result
of these events, intellectual capital temporarily lost some of its cachet. See Perry D. Quick &
Mary T. Goldschmid, FASB Statements 141/142 and the Business Economist-- Where, Oh
Where, Have My Intangibles Gone?, 37 Bus. ECON. 61, 61 (2002). The high-profile Enron case,
which involved fraudulent reporting of intangible assets, such as synthetic leases, contributed to
the unease about whether intangibles should be reported as valuable assets. See id; see also
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Measuring and Representing the Knowledge Economy: Accounting for
Economic Reality Under the Intangibles Paradigm, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 72-76, 83-90 (2006)
(describing the challenges and uncertainties arising from attempts to account for intangibles in
financial reporting, which facilitated fraudulent overstatement of the value of intangible assets
by Enron and other corporations).
94. This was part of a broader and ongoing convergence project between the FASB and
the IASB initiated in 2002. See AM. INST. CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS 5-6 (2011), available at http://www.ifrs.com/pdf/IFRSUpda
teV8.pdf. The current FASB and IASB standards for R&D differ substantially in that the IASB
standards provide for the capitalization of development costs. See IAS Standards No. 38, supra
note 79; see also Baruch Lev, Leandro Caflibano & Bernard Marr, An Accounting Perspective
on Intellectual Capital, in PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL, supra note 3, at 42, 47.
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decided not to move forward with it due to lack of resources. 95 In the
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the FASB's priorities shifted to
the accounting treatment of financial instruments and transactions.96
More recently, the financial accounting community has shown
renewed interest in financial accounting reforms.97 As the OECD stated
in 2012, there is "a growing consensus among practitioners and
policymakers that better reflection of intangibles in corporate reporting
is required to improve the functioning of capital markets and private
finance." 98 Despite the consensus that better reporting of information
about intellectual capital is necessary, disagreement over the best way to
achieve that goal persists.
99
C. National Accounting
National accounting is an area of research that has made significant
advances in measuring intellectual capital. National accounting
quantifies macroeconomic indicators of investment and productivity,'00
as distinguished from financial accounting, which quantifies individual
businesses' investment and productivity.' In the United States, the
BEA produces national income and product accounts (NIPAs), the most
comprehensive of which is gross domestic product (GDP)-the value of
all goods and services produced by the economy.'0 2 The government
95. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACTION ALERT No. 07-52 DEC. 28, 2007,
available at http://www.fasb.org/action/aa 122807.shtml.
96. In a 2013 FASB survey, the treatment of financial instruments dominated the list of
reform priorities. See Emily Chasan, FASB "s Future Priorities Start to Take Shape, WALL ST. J.,
(Sept. 17, 2013, 1:00 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2013/09/17/fasbs-future-priorities-start-to-
take-shape/ (indicating that the treatment of financial instruments occupied three of the top ten
reform priorities).
97. See OECD REPORT, supra note 7, at 51-54; Chasan, supra note 96 (noting that
accounting for intangible assets is among the top reform priorities in a 2013 FASB survey).
Earnings management with regard to intellectual capital reporting continues to cause unease.
See Gretchen Morgenson, Earnings, but Without the Bad Stuff, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/10/business/earnings-but-without-the-bad-stuff.html (noting
that Twitter reported "non-GAAP" results that were $90 million better than its GAAP results by
backing out expenses for compensation and certain intangibles and noting the prevalence of
nontraditional reporting and possible "accounting gimmickry" among technology and healthcare
companies).
98. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., CORPORATE REPORTING OF INTANGIBLE
ASSETS: A PROGRESS REPORT 21 (2012). But see INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENG. &
WALES, DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW REPORTING MODELS 16 (2009) [hereinafter ICAEW REPORT]
(arguing that a new approach to the financial reporting of intangibles is not necessary or
appropriate).
99. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
100. See Nakamura, Investing in Intangibles, supra note 6, at 27-28.
101. Nakamura, Intangibles, supra note 5, at 10-11.
102. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MEASURING THE ECONOMY: A
PRIMER ON GDP AND THE NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT ACCOUNTS 1 (2007), available at
http://www.bea.gov/national/pdf/nipa_primer.pdf.
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uses GDP to prepare the federal budget; the Federal Reserve uses GDP
to formulate monetary policy; and the business community uses GDP to
forecast economic performance and plan for production, investment,
and hiring.10 3 Other NIPAs contain detailed economic information that
governments, private businesses, and other organizations use for a wide
range of planning and policy purposes.'
0 4
1. Current Treatment of Intellectual Capital
Until recently, U.S. national accounting failed to include most
intellectual capital as investments in macroeconomic measures of
national productivity and wealth. 0 5 With the notable exception of
computer software and a few other minor exceptions,'0 6 the BEA
expensed and did not capitalize business investments in intellectual
capital.'0 7 As a result, during the late 1990s and early 2000s, the BEA
understated investment in intellectual capital by as much as $1 trillion
per year, according to Leonard Nakamura'0 8 as well as Carol Corrado,
Professor Charles Hulten, and Professor Daniel Sichel.' °9 Corrado,
Hulten, and Sichel found that when intellectual capital was included in
measurements of economic productivity during that period, it accounted
for 27% of economic growth, putting it on par with tangible capital in
importance as a source of growth." 0
The research of Nakamura, Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel, as well as
others"'-described in detail in the next Subsection-demonstrates the
extent to which the omission of intellectual capital distorted measures of
national economic productivity and wealth. In response to this research,
103. Id.
104. See generally FRANQOIS LEQUILLER & DEREK BLADES, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION
& DEV., UNDERSTANDING NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 326 (2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/
std/na/38451313.pdf.
105. See Nakamura, Intangibles, supra note 5, at 4, 10-11. This is also true of national
accounting in most other countries. See Hill, supra note 3, at 435-36.
106. The BEA has capitalized computer software since 1999. See Corrado et al., Measuring
Capital and Technology, supra note 6, at 26. It also capitalized certain oil and gas exploration
expenses and architectural and engineering services embedded in structures and equipment
purchases. See id. at 23.
107. See Nakamura, Intangibles, supra note 5, at 4, 10-11.
108. See Nakamura, Investing in Intangibles, supra note 6, at 35-36.
109. Corrado et al., Measuring Capital and Technology, supra note 6, at 30. Nakamura
explains how this omission led the BEA to report a low rate of personal savings that was
inconsistent with the substantial increases in personal wealth evidenced by gains in the
stock market. See Nakamura, Investing in Intangibles, supra note 6, at 27-28. Nakamura
argues that intangible investments such as R&D, advertising, software, and artistic creations are
difficult, but not impossible, to measure, although he acknowledges that the data is relatively
sparse for some industries such as financial services. See id. at 32-34.
110. See Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 6, at 680.
111. See, e.g., Barbara M. Fraumeni & Sumiye Okubo, R&D in the National Income and
Product Accounts: A First Look at Its Effect on GDP, in MEASURING CAPITAL IN THE NEW
ECONOMY, supra note 6, at 275 (exploring the effects of capitalizing R&D on GDP).
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in 2013, the BEA made a major change to its methodology for
measuring GDP: For the first time, the BEA included R&D and artistic
creations such as films, music, and books as investments rather than as
expenses.' 12 In 2013, these additions increased the size of the U.S.
economy by $560 billion, or 3.6%.113 In addition, the BEA is likely to
capitalize other types of intellectual capital in the future. 
14
2. Research and Reforms
Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel argue persuasively that national
measures of economic productivity and wealth should include
investment in intellectual capital. They develop a theoretical framework
to support this argument and provide a comprehensive methodology
demonstrating how to effectuate it. They are not the first researchers to
engage in this endeavor, 1 15 but according to the OECD, their model is
the most theoretically advanced and comprehensive to date and is
"widely accepted."'1 16 Moreover, as discussed in Part III, their model has
both theoretical and practical implications for the tax treatment of
intellectual capital. Thus, a detailed description of the model follows.
Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel's methodology focuses on uses of
resources, or inputs, as opposed to the production side of the economy,
or outputs. Their fundamental theoretical premise is that national
accounting ought to treat intellectual capital-intangibles, as they call
it-the same way it treats tangible capital such as plant or equipment. In
other words, "[in considering] whether business intangible outlays and
knowledge input should be expensed or capitalized in national
accounting systems-an unambiguous answer is obtained: there is no
basis from the consumers' point of view for treating investments in
intangible capital differently from investments in plant and equipment,
or tangible capital."'1 17 They further argue for the symmetric accounting
of investments, whether intangible or tangible:
112. See Jason Lange, Intangible Investments Cast US. Economy in Brighter Light,
REUTERS (July 28, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/28/us-usa-economy-
intangibles-analysis-idUSBRE96R4H20130728. The BEA also restated GDP for each year
retroactive to 1929, the first year of measurement. Coy, supra note 12.
113. See Bernstein & Baker, supra note 12.
114. See Lange, supra note 112 (interviewing BEA director Stephen Landefeld, who
indicated an interest in capitalizing product design and organizational planning once reliable
data is available).
115. See generally Charles R. Hulten, Total Factor Productivity: A Short Biography, in
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS 1 (Charles R. Hulten, Edward R. Dean &
Michael J. Harper eds., 2001) (explaining the Total Factor Productivity residual measure of
economic productivity which recognizes investments in R&D as a form of capital
accumulation).
116. OECD REPORT, supra note 7, at 12.
117. Corrado et al., Measuring Capital and Technology, supra note 6, at 13.
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[A]ny use of resources that reduces current consumption in
order to increase it in the future qualifies as an investment.
This result argues for symmetric treatment of all types of
capital and that business expenditures aimed at enhancing
the value of a firm and improving its products, including
human capital development as well as R&D, be accorded
the same treatment as tangible capital in national
accounting systems.1
8
Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel acknowledge the objections to
capitalization-primarily made in the financial accounting context-
that relate to the uncertainty of intellectual capital investments. They
identify and discuss three separate characteristics of intellectual capital
that contribute to this uncertainty: (1) the lack of verifiability when
businesses do not acquire intangibles through market transactions but
rather produce them internally; (2) the non-rivalness of some intangible
assets, such as R&D, i.e., the ability of many people to use such assets
simultaneously without reducing the quantity available to any single
user; and (3) the lack of appropriability of the returns from some
intangibles, such as employee training, i.e., the inability to capture fully
the benefits of such investments."'
With respect to lack of verifiability, Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel
note that businesses also produce internally tangible assets, giving rise
to the same concern, and conversely, that businesses sometimes acquire
intangible assets from third parties. 120 They also argue that difficulty in
valuing intangibles does not undermine the theoretical case for their
capitalization. 2 1 With respect to non-rivalness, they argue that
intellectual capital is necessarily valuable if a firm is willing to pay for
it.' 22 Moreover, they point out that many types of intellectual capital,
such as brand equity and organizational structures, are not non-rival, but
rather, are highly firm-specific and unavailable for others to use. 123 As
to both the non-rivalness and lack of appropriability objections, they
respond that these features do not invalidate the need to capitalize
intangible expenditures, rather, the capitalization issue pivots on
whether the expenditure provides a future benefit.12 1 In sum, the authors
conclude that none of these characteristics preclude intellectual capital
from a treatment symmetrical with that of tangible capital, and that
financial accounting ought to capitalize any expenditure that produces a
future benefit, whether tangible or intangible. 125
118. Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 6, at 666.
119. See id. at 666-67.





125. See id. at 666-67.
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Beginning with the theoretical proposition that intellectual capital
should receive the same treatment as tangible capital, Corrado, Hulten,
and Sichel construct a framework that enables them to answer
foundational questions such as how much growth in output is
unaccounted for because of the omission of intellectual capital and how
much of output growth is attributable to intellectual capital. 2 6 While the
ultimate purpose of their model is not germane to this Article, the
design of the model is highly relevant.
In order to achieve a more accurate and complete measure of the
contribution of intellectual capital to national economic productivity
and growth, Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel design their framework to be
broader than most previous efforts to identify intellectual capital.
127
They identify three major areas of business investment in intellectual
capital: (1) computerized information software, (2) innovative property
(scientific and nonscientific research and development), and (3)
economic competencies (brand-related investment such as advertising
and organizational investments such as training and strategic
planning).
128
Of particular note is the expansive R&D category, which includes
nonscientific R&D-the development and design of products by the
publishing, entertainment, and financial services industries-as well as
scientific R&D, which includes work in the physical sciences, the
biological sciences, and mineral exploration. 29 Corrado, Hulten, and
Sichel estimate that by the late 1990s, nonscientific R&D was at least as
large as traditional scientific research. 130 Also noteworthy is their
expansive economic competencies category, which includes advertising
and market research used to develop and maintain brands, costs of
developing and launching new products and developing customer lists,
workforce training and education, and organizational change and
development.' 3 ' They estimate that in 2000-2003, the most recent
period for which they have data, total investment in economic
competencies was nearly as large as the other two major categories
combined. 1
3 2
126. Id. at 663.
127. See Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 6, at 669; Corrado et al., Measuring
Capital and Technology, supra note 6, at 14.
128. See Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 6, at 669-70; Corrado et al.,
Measuring Capital and Technology, supra note 6, at 22-29.
129. See Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 6, at 670, 674; Corrado et al.,
Measuring Capital and Technology, supra note 6, at 24-28.
130. See Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 6, at 670; Corrado et al., Measuring
Capital and Technology, supra note 6, at 26.
131. See Corrado et al., Measuring Capital and Technology, supra note 6, at 28-29; see
also Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 6, at 670.
132. Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 6, at 670-71.
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Having established a comprehensive taxonomy of intellectual
capital, Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel then use available data to estimate
the amount of business investment in each category. The information
for some types of expenditures, such as scientific R&D, is well
developed. 133 For others, such as new product development, design, and
research in the financial services industries, the data is sparse, and the
estimates for these are quite rough, amounting in some cases to
"rudimentary guesses."' 34  Deriving estimates for the economic
competencies category is especially challenging. For example, Corrado,
Hulten, and Sichel acknowledge that some advertising does not enhance
a company's brand or otherwise provide future benefits (e.g., an ad for
"this week's sale"). 135 To account for this, they rely upon empirical
research on advertising, finding that only about 60% of total advertising
has long-lasting effects.' 36 Accordingly, they include only 60% of total
advertising as investment in brand equity. 137 To estimate spending on
organizational change and development, Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel
use data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to estimate amounts spent
on worker training. 138 They also use Census Bureau data to estimate
total spending on managerial and executive compensation and then
allocate-somewhat arbitrarily, they concede-one-fifth of this amount
to organizational innovation. 
39
Once they estimate investments in each category of intellectual
capital, Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel then estimate "depreciation rates"
in order to amortize the investments as their benefits are realized and as
they devalue over time.'40 This enables them to carry out the primary
goal of their model, which is to match investments in intellectual capital
with their outputs and determine their net productivity.' 4 ' It is worth
noting that the same matching of income and expenditures occurs in
133. Information on scientific R&D has been collected since the early 1950s by the Census
Bureau for the National Science Foundation. Corrado et al., Measuring Capital and Technology,
supra note 6, at 26.
134. See id. at 27-28.




139. See id.; Corrado et al., Measuring Capital and Technology, supra note 6, at 29.
140. See Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 6, at 674-75. The proper conversion
of Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel's depreciation rates to useful lives is unclear. For example, the
33% rate for computer software would suggest a three-year useful life, but this computation is
based on BEA's assumed service life of five years. It seems to be a declining balance
computation. See id. at 675 & n.20.
141. Id. at 663, 674.
THE TAXATION OF INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL
financial accounting and tax-a capitalized expenditure is amortized
over its useful life.
142
Using the limited empirical data about the useful lives of intellectual
capital, Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel roughly estimate depreciation rates
for their categories of intellectual capital. For example, they estimate
R&D (both scientific and nonscientific) to be 20% per year, which is the
midpoint of several empirical estimates that range from 11% to 26%.143
They estimate advertising (to enhance brand equity) depreciates at a rate
of 60% per year, based on a survey of sparse and unsettled empirical
data. 144 Their estimated depreciation rate for organizational resources,
such as employee training and organizational planning, is perhaps the
most arbitrary: They simply choose the midpoint between R&D and
brand equity, which is 40%.145 Thus, this last step of determining the
useful life and depreciation method for intellectual capital is imprecise
and somewhat arbitrary.
In sum, scholars in the fields of knowledge management, financial
accounting, and national accounting make a theoretically persuasive
claim, thoroughly supported by decades of research, that intellectual
capital is a central driver of economic productivity that has been poorly
understood and inaccurately measured. Their research significantly
advances the conceptual understanding of intellectual capital and
introduces new methodologies for identifying and measuring it. These
advances have major implications for the tax treatment of intellectual
capital. Before addressing these implications, the next Part of this
Article provides an overview of the current tax treatment of intellectual
capital.
1II. THE CURRENT TAx TREATMENT OF INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL
This Part addresses the tax treatment of investments in intellectual
capital. It first describes the theoretically ideal tax treatment and then
discusses how current tax law diverges from this ideal. It concludes
with an analysis of the costs of tax law's failure to tax intellectual
capital accurately.
A. In Principle: The "Norm of Capitalization "1 46
Tax law generally provides for the deduction or capitalization of
business expenditures. I.R.C. § 162 allows businesses to deduct "all the
142. Compare supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (addressing the financial
accounting context), with infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text (addressing the tax
context).
143. See Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 6, at 675.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 674-75.
146. 1NDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 84(1992).
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ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business. 147 I.R.C. § 263 provides that
businesses cannot deduct capital expenditures-"amount[s] paid out for
new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to
increase the value of any property or estate. 148
The idea that businesses should capitalize expenditures that produce
future benefits is integral to the concept of income, 149 and tax law has
required this capitalization since its inception. 5 ° As the Supreme Court
explained in INDOPCO v. Commissioner, capitalization matches such
expenditures with the revenue they produce in future years and thereby
achieves a more accurate measure of income:
The primary effect of characterizing a payment as either a
business expense or a capital expenditure concerns the
timing of the taxpayer's cost recovery: While business
expenses are currently deductible, a capital expenditure
usually is amortized and depreciated over the life of the
relevant asset, or, where no specific asset or useful life can
be ascertained, is deducted upon dissolution of the
enterprise. Through provisions such as these, the Code
endeavors to match expenses with the revenues of the
taxable period to which they are properly attributable,
thereby resulting in a more accurate calculation of net
income for tax purposes.
151
The Supreme Court delineated the distinction between current
deductions and capital expenditures not as a bright line test but rather as
a facts and circumstances determination. 52 In addition, the Court has
interpreted the capitalization requirement of I.R.C. § 263 in a decidedly
expansive manner, starting with the proposition that "deductions are
147. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2012).
148. Id. § 263.
149. As Calvin Johnson states:
A strong law of capitalization is extraordinarily important to an income tax.
Under the norms of an income tax, costs that constitute investments, generating
future income for the taxpayer, are capitalized and may not be deducted so long
as the costs continue to generate income .... The thesis that expensing an
investment, that is, deducting it immediately, is equivalent to exempting the
subsequent income from the investment from tax, is one of the bulwarks of
modem tax economics, but it is not generally known or appreciated within the
tax law community.
Johnson, Dividends, supra note 14, at 478. For a comprehensive overview of capitalization in
general, see Lee et al., Rough Justice (Part One), supra note 14; see also Lee et al., Rough
Justice (Part Two), supra note 14.
150. See I.R.C. § 263(a); Woodward v. Comm'r, 397 U.S. 572, 574-75 (1970).
151. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 83-84 (citations omitted).
152. See id. at 86.
2014] THE TAXATION OF INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 2255
exceptions to the norm of capitalization" '153 and are guided by the
principle that "a taxpayer's realization of benefits beyond the year in
which the expenditure is incurred is undeniably important in
determining whether the appropriate tax treatment is immediate
deduction or capitalization., 154 In several cases, the Court has required
capitalization of expenses such as legal fees that might be viewed as
quintessentially deductible expenses.155
With respect to tangible property, the Court's expansive view of
capitalization reached its zenith in Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co.,
156
where the Court held that depreciation allowances for equipment used
to construct new facilities were not deductible, but rather must be
capitalized-that is, added to the basis of the new facilities.1 57 Congress
subsequently enacted I.R.C. § 263A, a far-reaching extension of Idaho
Power that requires businesses to capitalize the direct and indirect costs
of constructing or producing tangible property. 1
58
With respect to intangible property (as discussed below, a tax term
closely related but not identical to intellectual capital as defined in this
Article), the Court further expanded its sweeping capitalization
principle in INDOPCO.159 In INDOPCO, the taxpayer, the National
Starch Corporation, paid investment banking, legal, and accounting fees
in connection with a merger in which Unilever acquired the stock of
National Starch. 160 National Starch claimed the majority of these
expenses as deductions under I.R.C. § 162.161 The government argued
153. Id. at 84.
154. Id. at 87. See generally John W. Lee, Transaction Costs Relating to Acquisition or
Enhancement of Intangible Property: A Popular, Political, but Practical Perspective, 22 VA.
TAX REv. 273, 311-19 (2002) (analyzing Supreme Court capitalization jurisprudence).
155. See, e.g., INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 88-90 (holding that investment banking, legal, and
accounting fees paid in connection with the taxpayer's being acquired by another company were
capital; creation or enhancement of a separate and distinct asset was not necessary); Comm'r v.
Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 347-49, 354 (1971) (concluding that mandatory
premium payments made by bank to Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation were
capital, and created or enhanced a "separate and distinct additional asset" (i.e., rights in a
secondary reserve fund), and were therefore not ordinary); Woodward, 397 U.S. at 573-74, 579
(holding that legal, accounting, and appraisal expenses incurred in acquiring minority stock
interest were capital); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580, 582-83, 585 (1970)
(holding that legal, consulting, and other fees paid by acquiring firm in connection with minority
appraisal rights were capital).
156. 418 U.S. 1 (1974).
157. See id. at 19.
158. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263A-1 to -6 (2013). Due to a definitional divergence between
"intangibles" and "intellectual capital" for tax purposes, certain types of intellectual capital are
also subject to § 263A of the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 263A (2012). See infra notes 198-
99 and accompanying text.
159. 503 U.S. at 87-88.
160. Id. at 80-82.
161. Id. at 82.
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that the expenses were capital in nature, and the Court agreed. 162 Much
of the Court's analysis focused on whether its prior decision,
Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n, required that an
expenditure create or enhance a "separate and distinct asset" in order to
be to classified as capital. 163 The Court held that no separate and distinct
asset was required.
164
The Court then considered the benefits to National Starch of being
acquired by Unilever. It found that National Starch would realize long-
term benefits in the form of: (1) "synergy" with Unilever, given
Unilever's plastic, chemical, paper, and packaging operations and its
strong consumer products orientation; (2) access to "Unilever's
enormous resources, especially in the area of basic technology;" and (3)
the corporate restructuring from a public company to "a wholly owned
subsidiary of Unilever," which eliminated National Starch's disclosure
and reporting requirements and corporate governance procedures. 165 In
light of these long-term benefits, the Court held that National Starch's
expenditures to facilitate the acquisition were capital.
166
On its face, the Court's decision in INDOPCO seemed to set forth a
broad capitalization principle, similar to the theoretical ideal articulated
by accounting scholars, 167 under which tax law must capitalize all
investments in intellectual capital. The Court's principal inquiry-
whether the expenditures in question produced a significant future
benefit-seems to require capitalization of the broad array of
expenditures included in these scholars' definitions of intellectual
capital. Furthermore, the particular future benefits identified by the
INDOPCO Court-brand and customer enhancement, research
capabilities, and corporate organization-map perfectly onto Corrado,
Hulten, and Sichel's expansive taxonomy of intellectual capital
investments. 168 Indeed, in the aftermath of INDOPCO, many scholars
162. See id. at 90.
163. See id at 85-87 (internal quotation marks omitted). National Starch was the target of
the acquisition and thus did not itself acquire any asset. See id. at 80.
164. See id. at 90.
165. Id. at 88-89 (internal quotation marks omitted).
166. Id. at 89-90. INDOPCO raised taxpayer concerns about the possibility of a greatly
expanded capitalization requirement, but these have proved to be unfounded. See Joseph
Bankman, The Story of INDOPCO: What Went Wrong in the Capitalization v. Deduction
Debate?, in TAX STORIES 225, 238-45 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2d ed. 2009). Subsequent case law
and regulatory guidance impose a considerably diminished capitalization requirement See infra
notes 192-97 and accompanying text; Bankman, supra, at 241-45.
167. See supra Sections IIB-C.
168. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text (explaining Corrado, Hulten, and
Sichel's three proposed categories of intellectual capital). The Court in effect held that National
Starch's expenditures, related to it being acquired by Unilever, enhanced National Starch's
goodwill. The Court disallowed a deduction for the expenditures; most commentators think this
means that the expenditures augmented National Starch's basis in its goodwill (which was at
2014] THE TAXATION OF INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 2257
and practitioners speculated that INDOPCO would vastly expand the
capitalization requirement. 169 However, as discussed in the next Section,
the speculation proved unfounded; to the contrary, the capitalization of
intellectual capital has become even more circumscribed.
B. In Practice: "Deductibility as the Default Rule -170
Consistent with INDOPCO, acquired intellectual capital is generally
capitalized under current law. However, the current law treatment of
self-created intellectual capital defies the sweeping capitalization
principle articulated by the Supreme Court in INDOPCO, 171and instead,
most investments in self-created intellectual capital are deductible.
As a preliminary matter, tax law does not use the term "intellectual
capital." Rather, it uses "intangibles" and "intangible assets," as defined
in a variety of statutory provisions and regulations. There is a fair
amount of overlap between these tax terms and intellectual capital as
defined in this Article. The following discussion generally uses the tax
terms "intangibles" and "intangible assets" interchangeably with the
term "intellectual capital" and points out where the two terms are
different.
1. Acquired Intellectual Capital
Where a business purchases intangible assets, as defined in I.R.C.
§ 197,172 from a third party as part of the acquisition of a larger
that time nonamortizable and thus would never be recovered by National Starch). See Johnson,
Dividends, supra note 14, at 466-67, 476.
169. See, e.g., Johnson, Big Win, supra note 14, at 1332-38 (predicting capitalization of a
variety of other previously deductible expenses including prepaid fees, business expansion
costs, environmental cleanup costs, and remedial costs). Johnson is one of the few who wrote
approvingly of INDOPCO's expansion in capitalization. See, e.g., id. at 1340-41. Many
practitioners and lobbyists were highly critical of it. See Bankman, supra note 166, at 238-40
(describing the negative reactions to the decision).
170. James L. Atkinson, The Final INDOPCO Regulations: A Primer, 56 TAX EXECUTIVE
222,224 (2004).
171. See Bankman, supra note 166, at 241-49 (describing subsequent judicial decisions on
capitalization and the administrative response and concluding that the INDOPCO decision was a
failure); Lee, Transaction Costs, supra note 14 (describing the audit and litigation challenges
faced by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in attempting to implement a broad capitalization
principle, the congressional and judicial resistance to such efforts, and the IRS's retreat).
172. The definition of intangibles under I.R.C. § 197 includes (but is not limited to):
goodwill; going concern value; workforce in place; business books and records; operating
systems or other information bases including customer lists; patents; copyrights; formulas;
processes; designs; knowhow; customer-based intangibles; supplier-based intangibles; licenses;
permits; other rights granted by a governmental unit; covenants not to compete; franchises;
trademarks; and trade names. I.R.C. § 197(d) (2012). Certain intangibles such as computer
software, oil and gas exploration, and financial intangibles are excluded from the general
treatment of intangibles under I.R.C. § 197, but they are still considered intangibles for other tax
purposes. See id. § 197(e).
business, the purchaser generally capitalizes and amortizes the
intangible assets ratably over fifteen years.173 Tax law excludes some
intangibles from this fifteen-year amortization rule and allows for their
amortization over shorter time periods or their outright deduction
t74
"Purchase" is a term of art in tax law related to mergers and
acquisitions. It typically refers to a taxable acquisition as opposed to a
tax-free acquisition. 7 5 In general, an acquisition is taxable when cash or
other property is the sole or primary consideration for the acquisition;
an acquisition is tax free when equity of the acquiring party is the sole
or primary consideration for the acquisition. 176 I.R.C. § 197 applies to
taxable acquisitions (i.e., purchases) but not to tax-free acquisitions.
177
Where intangible assets are acquired in a tax-free acquisition, the
acquiring party generally "steps into the shoes" of the selling party to
determine treatment of the intangibles.'78
To determine the cost of each asset in cases where an entire business
is purchased, the purchaser allocates the purchase price among specific
assets under a system known as the residual method. 179 This procedure
classifies assets into seven categories, and first allocates the purchase
price among assets in the first category up to their fair market value,
then allocates any remaining purchase price among assets in the second
category, and so on to each successive category until the purchase price
is exhausted. 8 ° Section 197 intangibles other than goodwill and going
concern value are in the sixth category; goodwill and going concern
value are in the seventh category.'
8'
Where intangible assets are purchased separately and not as part of a
larger business, their treatment is quite varied. Some of them, such as
customer lists, are subject to the fifteen-year amortization rule of I.R.C.
173. See id. §§ 197, 338, 1060. See generally MARTIN D. G1NSBURG ET AL., MERGERS,
AcQuISITIONS AND BUYOUTS 403.4.1.1-403.4.2 (2012); Jack S. Levin & Donald E. Rocap, A
Transactional Guide to New Code Section 197, TAX NOTES, Oct. 1993, at 461, 462; Michael L.
Schler, Basic Tax Issues in Acquisition Transactions, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 879, 887, 896
(2012); Mark J. Silverman, Purchase Price Allocation Rules: Sections 1060, 338, and 197,'
STEPTOE & JOHNSON, 41-43, 45-52 (2013), available at http://www.steptoe.com/publications-
1630.html.
174. See Levin & Rocap, supra note 173, at 463-66. For example, taxpayers amortize off
the shelf computer software purchased as part of a business over three years rather than fifteen.
See I.R.C. §§ 167(f), 197(e)(3). Taxpayers may deduct the cost of a franchise, trademark, or
trade name where the purchase price is contingent on its use or productivity. See id
§§ 197(f)(4)(C), 1253(d)(1).
175. See Schler, supra note 173, at 882, 885-87.
176. See I.R.C. §§ 354, 368; Schler, supra note 173, at 882.
177. See Levin & Rocap, supra note 173, at 462.
178. See I.R.C. § 197(f)(2); Silverman, supra note 173, at 55-56.
179. See Schler, supra note 173, at 896.
180. See I.R.C. § 1060(a); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.338-6, 1.1060-1(a)(1) (2013).
181. See I.R.C. §§ 338(b)(5), 1060(a); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.338-6(b), 1.1060-1(c).
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§ 197.182 Others, such as patents and copyrights, are excluded from the
fifteen-year amortization rule and instead are treated under other
applicable tax laws (in the case of a patent or copyright, for example,
amortization is over its remaining legal life).
183
Congress enacted I.R.C. § 197 in 1993 to resolve a highly contested
area of law relating to intangibles purchased as part of a larger
business. 184 Under the prior law, courts deemed goodwill to have an
indefinite life. 185  Therefore, the cost of purchased goodwill was
capitalized but not amortized.' 86 In contrast, taxpayers could amortize
other intangibles such as patents and copyrights during their useful
lives.'8 7 As a result, taxpayers had an incentive to allocate as much of
the purchase price as possible to intangibles other than goodwill,
particularly where the demarcation between goodwill and other
intangibles, such as customers lists, was very murky. 188 This led to a
great to deal of controversy between taxpayers and the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), and efforts to resolve the controversy proceeded along
parallel tracks in the courts and Congress. 189 In 1993, the Supreme
Court held in Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States that a
customer subscription list was an intangible separate from goodwill that
could be amortized.' 90 Later that year, Congress enacted I.R.C. § 197.191
2. Self-Created Intellectual Capital
Taxpayers may deduct most investments in self-created intellectual
capital. 192 In 2004, the IRS issued regulations-commonly referred to as
182. See I.R.C. § 197(d)(1)(c)(iv); Levin & Rocap, supra note 173, at 466.
183. See I.R.C. § 167(g); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3(a), -14(e); Nguyen & Maine, supra note
14, at 19-21.
184. See Walter G. Antognini & Mitchell J. Kassoff, Section 197: Congress and the IRS
Attempt to Settle Disputes Involving Amortization of Intangibles, 46 TAX EXECUTIVE 281, 281
(1994).
185. See Hous. Chronicle Publ'g Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1248 (5th Cir. 1973).
186. See id. at 1247-48.
187. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3(a) (2004).
188. See Antognini & Kassoff, supra note 184, at 281.
189. See Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Taxing the New Intellectual Property
Right, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 17-19 (2004) (discussing the controversies between taxpayers and
the IRS prior to I.R.C. § 197); Gregory M. Beil, Comment, Internal Revenue Code Section 197:
A Cure for the Controversy over the Amortization of Acquired Intangible Assets, 49 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 731 (1995); see also Silverman, supra note 173, at 36-41 (explicating, in outline format,
the legislative history of I.R.C. § 197 and how the Supreme Court's decision in Newark
Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546 (1993), spurred Congress to enact the
section).
190. Morning Ledger, 507 U.S. at 570.
191. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 13261(a), 107 Stat.
312, 532 (1993) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 197 (2012)).
192. See Atkinson, supra note 170, at 229 (stating that the final INDOPCO regulations
have made deductibility the norm for self-created intangibles).
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the INDOPCO regulations because they address many of the questions
and uncertainties raised by that case-setting forth an exclusive list of
eight relatively narrow types of intangible assets whose development or
creation costs businesses must capitalize. 193 As a practical matter,
because the IRS does not require capitalization with respect to other
self-created intangibles, taxpayers may deduct all other self-created
intangibles "without hesitation,"' 94 even though they theoretically might
be subject to capitalization.' 95 One commentator characterizes the
INDOPCO regulations as a "reversal of the notion that 'capitalization is
the norm,' with deductibility-at least in the context of created
intangibles-now being the default rule."'196 Another has suggested that
a more apt name for the regulations is the "Anti-INDOPCO
regulations."'
' 97
Due to a definitional divergence between "intangibles" as defined
for tax purposes and "intellectual capital," two other types of self-
created intellectual capital do not fall within the new "default rule" of
deductibility and, therefore, a business must capitalize them. First, tax
law treats costs related to business acquisitions, restructuring, and
recapitalizations as a separate category of expenditures that must be
capitalized in some cases. 198 Second, tax law defines films, sound
recordings, video, and books as tangible personal property for tax
193. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(d) (2004). The regulations require capitalization for: (1)
financial interests such as stock, debt and other financial instruments, and annuities; (2) prepaid
expenses such as prepaid insurance or rent; (3) membership or privileges such as a doctor's
payment to a hospital for lifetime staff privileges; (4) payments to governments for trademarks,
copyrights, permits, licenses, and franchises; (5) contract rights to use or be compensated for the
use of property, covenants not to compete, stand-still agreements, insurance policies,
endowments, or annuities; (6) contract terminations; (7) amounts paid for real property where
the taxpayer transfers ownership but retains significant economic benefits; and (8) defense or
perfection of title of intangible property. See id.; Yale, INDOPCO Regulations, supra note 14, at
440. See generally Atkinson, supra note 170; Johnson, Destroying the Tax Base, supra note 14,
at 1382.
194. See Yale, 1NDOPCO Regulations, supra note 14, at 437.
195. See id. at 438 (speculating that the INDOPCO regulations might be invalid and be
supplanted by the more expensive capitalization required under INDOPCO and other legal
precedent but concluding that as a practical matter, taxpayers can rely on the regulations); see
also Atkinson, supra note 170, at 224.
196. Atkinson, supra note 170, at 229.
197. See Yale, INDOPCO Regulations, supra note 15, at 436.
198. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-5 (2013); Atkinson, supra note 170, at 228-29; Mark J.
Silverman, Tax Treatment of Reorganization Costs, STEPTOE & JOHNSON 62-64 (June 2012),
available at http://www.steptoe.com/publications-bio-350.html (follow "Tax Treatment of
Reorganization Costs" hyperlink); Yale, INDOPCO Regulations, supra note 14, at 454-55.
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purposes and subjects the costs of developing them to the more
expansive capitalization rules applicable to tangible property.
99
Prior to the INDOPCO regulations, an extensive body of case law
and administrative guidance dealt with specific types of intellectual
capital investments and for the most part found them deductible. As a
practical matter, the INDOPCO regulations preempt the prior law;
however, the INDOPCO regulations are arguably invalid and in that
case the prior law would control.2 ° ° Additionally, the prior law provides
a sense of the landscape relating to the tax treatment of self-created
intellectual capital. Therefore, an overview of the prior law-organized
by reference to Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel's taxonomy-follows:
20 '
(1) Computerized software information:




(a) Scientific R&D, which includes mineral
exploration: Scientific R&D is generally
deductible.20 3 This deductibility extends
to intangible drilling costs and mining
exploration costs.
2 4
(b) Nonscientific R&D, which includes
publishing, entertainment, and financial
services: Several courts allowed
financial services businesses to deduct
market research related to new product
development.20 5  (One might also
classify market research in the brand
equity category.) On the other hand, one
case required a financial services
business to capitalize market research
199. See I.R.C. § 263A(a)-(b) (2012); supra note 158 and accompanying text. Writers,
photographers, and artists are exempt from these capitalization requirements. See I.R.C.
§ 263A(h).
200. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
201. For detailed surveys of prior case law, regulations, and rulings, see Johns, supra note
14, at 770-83; Mundstock, supra note 14, at 1220, 1222-24, 1228-36; Lee et al., Rough Justice
(Part One), supra note 14; Walberg, supra note 14, at 1270-94.
202. See Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303 (holding that the IRS will not challenge a
taxpayer's decision to currently deduct costs attributable to software development), superseded
on other grounds by Rev. Proc. 2000-50, 2000-1 C.B. 601, modified in part by Rev. Proc. 2007-
16, 2007-1 C.B. 358.
203. See I.R.C. § 174(a)(1).
204. See id. §§ 263(c), 617.
205. See, e.g., NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 294 (4th Cir. 1982).
where it related to a possible business
expansion, i.e., the opening of a new
branch.2°6 (Business expansion costs
may qualify for inclusion in the
organization innovation category.) The
court in one case upheld a bank's
deduction for employee compensation
and overhead attributable to loan
origination.2 °7 However, in another case,
the court required a financial services
business to capitalize employee
compensation related to the acquisition
of installment obligations.20 8
(3) Economic Competencies:
(a) Brand equity, including advertising and
market research: Advertising is
generally deductible.20 9 As mentioned
above, market research related to new
products is deductible, but those costs
related to a business expansion must be
capitalized. 10
(b) Firm specific human capital, including
worker training: Employer-provided
worker training costs are generally
deductible.2 1
206. See Cent. Tex. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1182, 1185 (5th
Cir. 1984). This is consistent with the treatment of "start-up costs"---costs incurred before the
taxpayer is actually engaged in a trade or business-which generally must be capitalized. See
I.R.C. § 195(a). See generally John W. Lee, Start-Up Costs, Section 195, and Clear Reflection
of Income: A Tale of Talismans, Tacked-On Tax Reform, and a Touch of Basics, 6 VA. TAX REV.
1 (1986) (providing an in-depth analysis of I.R.C. § 195, particularly the conflict between the
definitional and functional tests for the capitalization of start-up business costs, as well as the
judicial development and practical impact of the provision).
207. See PNC Bancorp Inc. v. Comm'r, 212 F.3d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 2000). The INDOPCO
regulations require capitalization of costs related to the creation of financial intangibles such as
loans, but because of the exceptions for employee compensation, overhead, and de minimis
expenses, loan origination costs are generally not subject to capitalization under the regulations.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(e)(4) (2013).
208. See Lychuk v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 374, 375 (2001).
209. See Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 7. There are some limited cases where capitalization
of advertising expenses has been required. See, e.g., Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United
States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 231-33 (1985) (requiring capitalization of advertising to defuse opposition
to the taxpayer's application for a license to construct a nuclear plant where the expansion to
nuclear power represented a new business).
210. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
211. See Rev. Rul. 96-62, 1996-2 C.B. 9. A few cases have held that worker training costs
had to be capitalized. See, e.g., Cleveland Elec., 7 Cl. Ct. at 227-29 (holding that a utility's
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(c) Organization change and development:
Under INDOPCO, businesses must
capitalize legal, accounting, and
investment banking fees related to
corporate reorganizations and
restructuring.212 After the Court decided
INDOPCO, the IRS ruled that
businesses could deduct severance
payments related to a corporate
downsizing. 213 The IRS also ruled that a
utility company could deduct costs
incurred to improve energy conservation
and efficiency.
-2 14
C. The Costs of Improper Tax Treatment of
Intellectual Capital
By providing for the deduction, rather than capitalization, of self-
created intellectual capital investments, tax law incorrectly measures the
income from intellectual capital. The deduction effectively imposes a
zero rate of tax on returns from self-created intellectual capital. 215 This
under-taxation of the income from intellectual capital results in an
enormous loss of tax revenues. To illustrate, the House Ways and
Means Committee estimated that replacing the deduction for scientific
R&D with capitalization and five-year amortization would increase tax
revenues by $192.6 billion over the next ten years.216 According to
Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel, scientific R&D comprised less than one-
fifth of all investments in intellectual capital during 2000-2003.217
In addition to revenue loss, the under-taxation of income from
intellectual capital incentivizes overinvestment in intellectual capital
expansion from coal-powered electricity to nuclear power was a new business, and therefore,
costs related to it were capital).
212. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 88 (1992).
213. See Rev. Rul. 94-77, 1994-2 C.B. 19.
214. See Rev. Rul. 95-32, 1995-16 I.R.B. 8.
215. See Johnson, Undertaxation of Intangibles, supra note 14, at 1289-91; see also
Weisbach, supra note 14, at 200 ("[T]ax law .... allows an immediate deduction, effectively
choosing not to tax the return to [intangible benefit] activities at all."); Yale, Capitalization
Exceptions, supra note 14, at 555 (describing that misidentifying a capital cost as a deductible
can cause over- or under- taxation). Cary Brown was the first to demonstrate that a deduction
for an investment is equivalent to a tax exemption on the income from that investment. See E.
Cary Brown, Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in INCOME, EMPLOYMENT
AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H. HANSEN 300 (1948).
216. WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE MAJORITY TAX STAFF, TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014,
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS 55 [hereinafter TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014], available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ways-andmeans-sectioln-bysection-summary_final
022614.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2014).
217. See Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 6, at 671 tbl. 1. For the years 2000-
2003, they estimate total annual investment in intellectual capital to be $1.226.2 trillion and
scientific R&D to be $230.5 billion. Id.
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relative to other types of capital, which results in the misallocation of
economic resources. 21 8 For example, a pharmaceutical company may
decide to invest in R&D rather than a new plant because it can deduct
the R&D but must capitalize and depreciate the cost of a new plant,
where, in the absence of the R&D deduction, the new plant would be
the superior investment.21 9 Similar misallocations can arise from the
fact that not all intellectual capital investments are deductible.220 For
example, the pharmaceutical company may decide to create its own
patent rather than acquire one from a third party because it can deduct
the costs of the self-created patent but must capitalize and amortize the
cost of the acquired patent, even where, in the absence of the R&D
deduction, acquiring the patent might otherwise be more cost-
effective.22'
Paradoxically, the tax deduction for self-created intellectual capital
creates an incentive that opposes the incentive created by financial
reporting. The expensing (rather than capitalization) of self-created
intellectual capital for financial reporting purposes results in the
understatement of a business's profits and assets, thereby creating an
incentive for businesses to underinvest in intellectual capital. In
contrast, the tax law deduction for intellectual capital, by understating
218. See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON DEPRECIATION RECOVERY
PERIODS AND METHODS 2 (2000), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/Documents/depreci8.pdf; THE PRESIDENT'S EcON. RECOVERY ADVISORY BD., THE
REPORT ON TAX REFORM OPTIONS: SIMPLIFICATION, COMPLIANCE, AND CORPORATE TAXATION 67
(2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/PERAB Tax-
Reform Report.pdf. See generally Fullerton & Lyon, supra note 14 (quantifying, in terms of
social welfare costs, the misallocation of resources that results from allowing the deduction of
intangibles).
219. See Hubbard, supra note 80, at 2046-47 (discussing the failure of pharmaceutical
companies to invest in manufacturing because they focus mostly on research and development).
220. See Gravelle & Taylor, supra note 14, at 81 (analyzing the efficiency implications of
the differential treatment of acquired and self-created intangibles); Allen Walburn, Comment,
Depreciation of Intangibles: An Area of the Tax Law in Need of Change, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
453, 469-70 (1993).
221. See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 14, at 16-27.
Equity concerns arise over the current taxation of intellectual capital, particularly when
business investment in intellectual capital is compared to individuals' investments in their own
human capital. Although a full treatment is beyond the scope of this Article, the treatment of
education and training provides an illustration of these concerns. Employer-provided training is
deductible, but a worker's own investments in education and training are for the most part
neither deductible nor capitalized. The individual never recovers the costs of her own
investments in education and training. This has equity implications for employees versus self-
employed individuals and for business owners versus workers. See Fellows & Kahng, supra
note 39, at 362-65 (discussing the disparate tax treatment of individuals' human capital in the
context of education and training).
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taxable income, creates an incentive to overinvest in it.222 These
conflicting incentive effects are not corrective of each other. The
misallocations they produce will occur unevenly in different sectors of
the economy depending on the size and nature of the business, the level
of competition in that sector, and many other variables.223 Most
importantly, the tax deduction for self-created intellectual capital not
only leads to miscalculation of taxable income, but likely introduces
inefficiencies and inaccurate valuations into the economy.
Some have argued that the tax deduction for self-created intellectual
capital is intended to subsidize at least certain types of intellectual
capital, principally R&D, because these investments produce positive
externalities (so-called spillover effects) and are thus socially
valuable. 224 Tax law clearly has explicit incentives for R&D, such as the
R&D credit225 and the tax credit to develop drugs for rare diseases or
conditions (the orphan drug tax credit).226 However, it is not entirely
clear that Congress intended the R&D deduction to be an explicit
subsidy.227 Rather, ease of administration figures more prominently as a
222. See Leslie A. Robinson & Richard Sansing, The Effect of "Invisible " Tax Preferences
on Investment and Tax Preference Measures, 46 J. ACCT. & EcoN. 389 (2008) (quantifying the
effects on corporate investment of these competing incentives).
223. See id. at 402-03.
224. See Fullerton & Lyon, supra note 14, at 82; Martin A. Sullivan, Will International Tax
Reform Slow U.S. Technology Development?, 141 TAx NOTES 459, 459 (2013); Yale,
Capitalization Exceptions, supra note 14, at 564.
Another rationale might be that policy makers need to subsidize investments in intellectual
capital to offset the aversion that people have to risky investments. See Nakamura, Investing in
Intangibles, supra note 6, at 30. This author has not seen that argument made by tax scholars,
although it is a common rationale for other tax preferences such as capital gains. See, e.g.,
Michael Livingston, Risky Business: Economics, Culture and Taxation of High-Risk Activities,
48 TAx L. REv. 163, 191 (1993).
225. See I.R.C. § 41 (2012).
226. See id. § 45C.
227. See Snow v. Comm'r, 416 U.S. 500, 503-04 (1974) (finding that the purpose of the
R&D deduction is to encourage smaller firms to invest in R&D); Mark L. McConaghy &
Richard B. Ruge, Congressional Intent, Long-Standing Authorities Support Broad Reading of
Section 174, 58 TA NOTES 639 (1993) (explaining that the legislative history suggests the R&D
deduction was meant to apply broadly); Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, The History of
Intellectual Property Taxation: Promoting Innovation and Other Intellectual Property Goals?,
64 SMU L. REv. 795, 831-32 (2011) (describing the historical view that the R&D deduction is
an incentive).
The government currently takes an ambivalent stance on whether the R&D deduction is a
tax expenditure-an explicit tax subsidy. On one hand, the government lists the R&D deduction,
along with the I.R.C. § 41 research and expenditure credit, as tax expenditures in the
congressional and Treasury Department tax expenditure budgets. See J. COMM. ON TAXATION,
ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012-2017 30 tbl. 1 (Comm. Print
2013), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4503; OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: FISCAL YEAR
2013 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 254 tbl.17-2 (2012), available at
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rationale for allowing deductions for intellectual capital.228 Moreover,
even assuming that the R&D deduction was in fact intended as a
subsidy, one can make a strong argument that it is overly generous,
particularly in the presence of other generous R&D subsidies such as
the R&D credit, and especially as applied to multinational businesses
that are adept at reducing the tax on intangibles-based income through
the use of transfer pricing and other avoidance techniques. 229 Finally,
even if an R&D subsidy can be justified, the current law allowing for
the deduction of almost all self-created intellectual capital is over
inclusive. For example, it is hard to justify a deduction for advertising to
promote a brand on the grounds that it provides socially valuable
spillover effects. In fact, some have argued the exact opposite-that
advertising has negative externalities. 230 Instead of a blanket rule of
deductibility, tax law should begin with the correct treatment of
intellectual capital investments (i.e., capitalization) and then specify
what circumstances warrant divergence from this treatment.231 Under
this approach, the orphan drug tax credit, which targets the development
of drugs to treat rare diseases or conditions, for example, might be a
justifiable subsidy but the wholesale deduction of all R&D would not.
To summarize, foundational principles of tax law and Supreme
Court jurisprudence seem to dictate that taxpayers must capitalize
investments in intellectual capital. In practice, however, taxpayers must
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2013-PER/pdf/BUDGET-2013-PER.pdf. On the other
hand, the Treasury explanation states that while the deduction is considered a tax expenditure
under the "normal tax method," it is considered not to be one under the "reference law
baseline":
Research and experimentation (R&E) projects can be viewed as investments
because, if successful, their benefits accrue for several years. It is often
difficult, however, to identify whether a specific R&E project is successful and,
if successful, what its expected life will be. Because of this ambiguity, the
reference law baseline tax system would allow of expensing of R&E
expenditures. In contrast, under the normal tax method, the expensing of R&E
expenditures is viewed as a tax expenditure.
Id. at 266.
228. See infra notes 249-54 and accompanying text.
229. See generally Graetz & Doud, supra note 38, at 392-404 (evaluating current
technological innovation tax incentives such as the R&D credit, patent boxes, and super-
deductions in light of income-shifting strategies of multinational businesses, but not identifying
or analyzing the R&D deduction as a tax subsidy).
230. See Fullerton & Lyon, supra note 14, at 83. See generally Mona Hymel,
Consumerism, Advertising, and the Role of Tax Policy, 20 VA. TAX REV. 347 (2000) (discussing
the public welfare concerns of federal tax policy on advertising).
231. This comports with both the "norm of capitalization" articulated in INDOPCO and the
well-established view that deviations from the ideal income tax base should be explicitly and
intentionally acknowledged as such. See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES (1985).
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capitalize intellectual capital only when it is acquired from third parties.
Taxpayers may deduct most investments in self-created intellectual
capital, which results in substantial revenue losses and serious
misallocations of resources.
IV. ASSESSMENT AND REFORM
This Part assesses the tax treatment of intellectual capital in the
context of a bigger picture that includes the fields of knowledge
management, financial accounting, and national accounting. Scholars in
these disciplines portray intellectual capital as a central driver of
economic productivity that has been poorly understood and inaccurately
measured. They argue persuasively for improvements in measuring,
monitoring, and reporting intellectual capital.
As in these other fields, tax law fundamentally mismeasures
intellectual capital and must be reformed. However, the reader must
keep in mind that each discipline brings a different perspective to
intellectual capital. Thus, while financial accounting, national
accounting, and tax law have much in common, they also differ in
meaningful ways. What they have in common is a fundamental
objective-the accurate measurement of economic income-as well as
a fundamental failure to achieve this objective with respect to
intellectual capital.232 At the same time, the systems differ with respect
to the purposes for which they measure economic income-to maximize
corporate profitability, to provide accurate information to shareholders,
to allow governments to formulate fiscal policy, or to raise revenue
through tax collection.233 Moreover, the systems sometimes have
objectives ancillary to the primary goal of accurately measuring
economic income. 234 In evaluating the taxation of intellectual capital
and considering proposals for reform, this Part draws on the research,
methodologies, and reform proposals in other fields but remains
cognizant that differences of objective and purpose might dictate
different prescriptions.
A. Financial Accounting and Tax
In financial accounting, Lev and Zarowin propose to require
capitalization of self-created intellectual capital.2 35 Under their proposal,
232. See Lily Kahng, Perspectives on the Relationship Between Financial and Tax
Accounting, in CONTROVERSIES IN TAx LAW: A MATTER OF PERSPECTIVE (forthcoming 2014)
(comparing financial and tax accounting systems).
233. See id (manuscript at 4-5).
234. In particular, other objectives of the tax system include ease of administration,
achieving a predictable stream of income, and promoting economic or social policies through
the use of tax preferences. Id. (manuscript at 5).
235. See supra text accompanying note 86.
2267
once pre-specified feasibility tests were met, managers would capitalize
and amortize intellectual capital in accordance with industry norms and
research findings about the useful lives of various investments.236 This
proposal could be adapted to the tax system, although it would need
modification to be administrable. In particular, Congress would have to
formulate the feasibility tests with objectivity and specificity and make
the amortization periods simple and formulaic, much like the current tax
law depreciation schedules for tangible property.
2 37
Lev and Zarowin's second proposal-to reverse outlays expensed in
prior years once they produce demonstrable benefits in the future238-is
theoretically intriguing as a mechanism to deal with the fact that
intellectual capital outlays can produce future benefits that are uncertain
at the time of the expenditure. It is similar to depreciation recapture for
tangible property under current law, which in effect reverses
depreciation deductions when it becomes clear (upon subsequent sale)
that the depreciation deductions were more generous than the actual
devaluation of the asset.239 However, depreciation recapture merely
changes the character of gain (from capital to ordinary) realized upon
the sale or other disposition of the depreciated property.240 In contrast,
Lev and Zarowin's proposal would require a taxpayer to revisit prior
years and "undo" deductions for intellectual capital, along with
adjustments to multiple subsequent years to reflect capitalization and
amortization of the intellectual capital. The administrative constraints of
the tax system-with its emphasis on certainty, finality, and an assured
revenue stream-militate against such a fluid treatment.24' On the other
hand, tax law also has a set of tax benefit principles that allow for
adjustments when the IRS improperly taxes a prior year's transaction or
event.242
Within the financial accounting realm, it seems unlikely that the
FASB will adopt Lev and Zarowin's proposals in the near future. Many
scholars express concerns about their capitalization approach. These
concerns also bear on whether and to what extent the tax system should
require capitalization of intellectual capital.
236. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
237. See I.R.C. § 168 (2012).
238. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
239. See I.R.C. §§ 1245(a)(1), 1250(a)(1).
240. See id. §§ 1245(a)(1), 1250(a)(1).
241. See Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 365-66 (1931) (highlighting the
need for a fixed accounting period to produce ascertainable amounts of revenue at regular
intervals). See generally MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 599-620 (7th ed. 2013) (discussing the annual accounting period and
exceptions thereto).
242. See I.R.C. §§ 111, 1341; Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r, 460 U.S. 370, 372 (1983);
United States v. Skelly Oil. Co., 394 U.S. 678, 680-81 (1969).
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Critics of capitalization proposals, such as Lev and Zarowin's, argue
that the future benefits of self-created intellectual capital are speculative
or uncertain.2 43  They argue that in keeping with the inherent
conservatism of financial accounting, businesses should expense outlays
for self-created intellectual capital, on the assumption that such outlays
will produce no future benefit.2"
Regardless of whether this argument is persuasive for financial
accounting, it fails in the tax context because tax law does not share the
conservatism of financial accounting. As the Supreme Court observed
in Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner,2 45 "financial accounting has
as its foundation the principle of conservatism, with its corollary that
'possible errors in measurement [should] be in the direction of
understatement rather than overstatement of net income and net
assets"'' 246 in contrast to "the major responsibility of the Internal
Revenue Service ... protect[ion of] the public fisc." 247 Thus, one cannot
impute the conservatism of financial accounting, which arguably
militates against capitalization, to the tax law, which seeks to ensure the
collection of revenue. Indeed, a contrary rule in favor of capitalization
and against deductibility would most enhance revenue for the Treasury.
It would also comport with the Court's assertion in INDOPCO that
"deductions are exceptions to the norm of capitalization." 248
Even if a principle of conservatism does not govern tax law, that
intellectual capital investments sometimes produce uncertain or
speculative future benefits remains a serious obstacle to accurate
measurement. Indeed, some scholars seem to assume that the current tax
law deduction for self-created intellectual capital is an intentional
legislative or administrative decision based on the grounds that it is too
difficult to value in the first place.
24 9
243. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
244. See Hulten, supra note 80, at 3-4 (noting that both financial accounting and national
accounting tend toward conservatism); ICAEW REPORT, supra note 98, at 13-14. This also
explains why acquired intellectual property is capitalized in both financial accounting and tax-
a market transaction of certainty establishing its value has occurred.
245. 439 U.S. 522 (1979).
246. Id. at 542 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
247. Id. Stating that "the accountant's conservatism cannot bind the Commissioner in his
efforts to collect taxes," the Court upheld the power of the IRS to disallow a loss deduction on
unsold inventory, even though the loss had been reported by the taxpayer in its financial
statements, and rejected the taxpayer's argument that the tax loss was presumptively valid by
reason of its financial accounting treatment. Id. at 543, 537-39.
248. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992).
249. See Gravelle & Taylor, supra note 14, at 81 (stating that the "tax treatment of created
intangibles is largely due to administrative considerations, since it would be difficult in practice
to identify those costs which are creating an intangible"); Weisbach, supra note 14, at 200
(stating that "[b]ecause of [valuation] problems, the tax law often does not even try to measure
depreciation for intangibles" and that "[i]nstead, it allows an immediate deduction, effectively
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There is scant direct evidence of a deliberate decision that self-
created intellectual capital should be deductible because it is too
difficult to value.250 Nonetheless, concerns about administrability are
clearly a dominant theme throughout the long and tortured history of
capitalization.251  For example, in the aftermath of INDOPCO,
capitalization issues consumed as much as 40% of the IRS's audit
resources for medium and large businesses, and one purpose of
INDOPCO regulations clearly was to reduce IRS and taxpayer
resources devoted to capitalization issues. 25 2 That said, administrative
choosing not to tax the return to these activities at all"). But see Johnson, Undertaxation of
Intangibles, supra note 14, at 1291 ("[T]here is no indication [that] a reasoned balance between
convenience and a level economic playing field was ever under consideration. The expensing of
intangible investments is not part of a deliberate decision to punish the disfavored tangible
investments... or to subsidize intangible investments.").
250. The only evidence of legislative purpose to this effect is from a Joint Committee on
Taxation report studying the impact on small business of replacing the federal income tax:
Under present law, many expenditures by a business that may contribute to the
creation of intangible assets are currently deductible as expenses of doing
business. Thus, for example, salaries of employees, advertising, and other
operating expenses generally are currently deductible, even though these
expenditures may create or enhance the goodwill, going concern value,
reputation, or customer base of the business. Expensing generally is allowed
under present law because of the administrative difficulty of ascertaining the
extent to which these expenditures contribute to the value of the intangible
asset.
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATiON, 104T CONG., IMPACT ON SMALL BusINEss OF REPLACING THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAx 83 (Comm. Print 1996), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=st
artdown&id=2183. The text of the report is about 100 pages long and studies the impact on small
business of replacing the income tax with a national sales tax, a value-added tax, or a
consumption tax, and devotes only a few pages to a discussion of the taxation of intangibles. See
id. at 82-93.
There is evidence that Congress enacted the R&D deduction to address the administrative
difficulties of capitalizing R&D expenditures. S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 33 (1954) (describing the
difficulties of capitalization where a project is not abandoned or where a useful life is not
determinable, and stating that the purpose of the R&D deduction is to "eliminate uncertainty and
encourage taxpayers to carry on research and experimentation"); See H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, at
28 (1954) (describing the difficulties of capitalization where a project is not abandoned or where
a useful life is not determinable, and stating that the purpose of the R&D deduction is to
"eliminate uncertainty and encourage taxpayers to carry on research and experimentation");
Donald C. Alexander, Research and Experimental Expenditures Under the 1954 Code, 10 TAX
L. REV. 549, 551-52 (1955) (describing the difficulties of capitalizing R&D expenditures under
prior law that Congress intended to ameliorate by enacting the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
which provided that such costs should be deducted); David S. Hudson, The Tax Concept of
Research or Experimentation, 45 TAX LAWYER 85, 112-13 (1991) (stating that the purpose of
the R&D deduction was "to eliminate disputes about what the proper treatment of such
expenditures should be, and to ameliorate the hardships created by the capitalization rules").
251. See Bankman, supra note 166, at 183; Lee et al., Rough Justice (Part One), supra note
14, at 637-40; Lee, Transaction Costs, supra note 14, at 308-10.
252. See Lee, Transaction Costs, supra note 14, at 310.
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concerns about the uncertainty and difficulty of valuation do not justify
a default rule of deductibility. In other contexts involving these
administrative concerns, default rules often favor the government, not
the taxpayer.253 Alternatively, when faced with these administrative
challenges, the law sometimes adopts a "rough justice" rule. I.R.C.
§ 197's fifteen-year amortization period for acquired intangibles aptly
illustrates this rule; tax law is replete with other examples as well.254
A second objection to capitalization of intellectual capital in
financial accounting is the risk of earnings management-that managers
would capitalize aggressively to overstate profits and asset values.255
This risk is a serious concern, as even Lev and Zarowin acknowledge. 6
Cases like that of Enron, which involved the fraudulent reporting of
intangible assets such as synthetic leases, contribute to the unease about
whether intangibles should be capitalized. 5 7 Regardless of how serious
the earnings management concern is to the financial reporting of
intellectual capital, the tax system does not share this concern. This is
because in tax, businesses have the exact opposite incentive-to
aggressively deduct (rather than capitalize) in order to understate (rather
than overstate) income reported to the tax authorities. 25 8 There is little
risk that businesses would aggressively capitalize their intellectual
capital investments for tax purposes.
A third objection to capitalization of self-created intellectual capital
for financial accounting purposes is that quantitative reporting does not
adequately capture the value of intellectual capital. This argument looks
253. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 274(d) (2012) (disallowing business or investment deductions that
the taxpayer cannot substantiate); Treas. Reg. § 1. 162-5(b)(1) (2003) (allowing no deduction for
education expenses on the grounds that they are an "an inseparable aggregate of personal and
capital expenditures"); Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184, 187-89 (1943) (concluding that, in
determining the amount of a gift, the value of the retained interest was presumed to be zero
where it was not capable of valuation using actuarial methods).
254. See, e.g., supra notes 172-93 and accompanying text (discussing I.R.C. § 197).
Another example of this "rough justice" approach is the 50% limitation on deductions for
business meals and entertainment. See I.R.C. § 274(n). The use of safe harbors, which draw
somewhat arbitrary lines in order to provide certainty, provides a further example. See Emily
Cauble, Safe Harbors in Tax Law, 47 CoNN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 15-18),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-2318438.
255. See supra note 97.
256. See Lev & Zarowin, supra note 84, at 379.
257. See Arewa, supra note 93, at 72-76, 83-90 (describing the challenges and
uncertainties arising from attempts to account for intangibles in financial reporting, which
facilitated fraudulent overstatement of the value of intangible assets by Enron and other
corporations); Quick & Goldschmid, supra note 93, at 61-62.
258. Scholars and policymakers have considered whether this contrariety of incentives can
be used to rein in both earnings management and tax avoidance. This could be accomplished by
requiring conformity between the financial and taxable income, or by imposing a tax on the
difference between the two, or by requiring disclosure of differences. See Kahng, supra note
232 (manuscript at 10-11).
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to other scorecard metrics such as the Skandia Navigator, the Balanced
Scorecard, or narrative accounts as sources of more accurate and
complete information about the ways in which intellectual capital adds
value to a business. Even if this is true in financial reporting-and there
is no consensus at this time-the tax system cannot use scorecards or
narratives. It must have a clear rule or set of rules about how intellectual
capital should be taxed, even if those rules are sometimes inaccurate.
2 5 9
B. National Accounting and Tax
The national accounting model developed by Corrado, Hulten, and
Sichel has both theoretical and practical implications for the tax
treatment of intellectual capital. The model is based on the foundational
theoretical claim that intellectual capital ought to be treated like other
capital investments. This theoretical claim is equally compelling for tax
purposes.
In addition to establishing a theoretical foundation for capitalization
of intellectual capital, Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel's model
demonstrates how this theoretical ideal can be implemented for
macroeconomic purposes. Some, but not all, of their research is
transferable to the tax context. Specifically, the basic methodology-to
identify and capitalize inputs related to intellectual capital and to
depreciate these investments over their useful lives-matches up well
with the tax approach of capitalization and depreciation. In contrast,
some other national accounting methodologies do not match up well;
for example, the approach that looks at stock values to infer the value of
intangibles owned by businesses is not easily adaptable for tax
purposes.26 °
Furthermore, Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel's expansive taxonomy
promotes awareness and acceptance of a capacious definition of
intellectual capital beyond the traditional narrower conception that
includes only scientific R&D or legally protected intellectual property.
It also helps legitimize what might seem to be a radical claim that
certain outlays (e.g., compensation or advertising) ought to be
capitalized. Moreover, Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel's model exemplifies
259. See generally David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax
Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627 (1999) (describing that tax law is full of arbitrary line drawing
and advocating for those lines to be drawn more efficiently). Perhaps the analogous approach to
the financial reporting narrative approach would be the use of a facts-and-circumstances
standard in tax law as opposed to a bright-line rule to determine whether and to what extent
taxpayers should capitalize intellectual capital. The Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area-
INDOPCO and Newark Morning Ledger--essentially amounts to such a facts-and-
circumstances approach. See Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 570
(1993); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 86 (1992).
260. See, e.g., Robert E. Hall, The Stock Market and Capital Accumulation, 91 AM. EcoN.
REV. 1185, 1198-99 (2001).
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how businesses can use empirical data to estimate what portion of
expenses, such as advertising or managerial compensation, provide
future benefits and to approximate the useful lives of intellectual capital
investments. It refutes the tax argument that, because intellectual capital
is difficult to measure, tax law should simply abandon any capitalization
effort and allow the deduction of all intellectual capital. In presenting
their model, Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel cite John Maynard Keynes's
trenchant observation that "it is better to be imprecisely right than
precisely wrong."
'2 61
Congress could potentially adopt the design features of Corrado,
Hulten, and Sichel's model for the tax system. Indeed, in its 2013
proposals to capitalize and amortize over five years R&D and 50% of
advertising, the Senate Finance Committee explicitly refers to Corrado,
Hulton, and Sichel's model and their empirical estimates in a staff
discussion draft.262
Although the adoption of their model for tax purposes is a tantalizing
idea, this author believes it has serious administrative drawbacks that
render it unworkable. One crucial difference between tax and national
accounting is who quantifies and classifies intellectual capital outlays.
In national accounting, the BEA relies on empirical data such as R&D
data collected by the National Science Foundation and employment data
gathered by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Furthermore, the BEA
presumably has a team of disinterested experts to determine whether a
particular expenditure ought to be classified as R&D or something
else-market research or advertising, for example.
In contrast, the tax system would need to rely on taxpayers to report
accurately the amount and character of their intellectual capital
investments. The history of acquired intangibles culminating in the
enactment of I.R.C. § 197 demonstrates the perils of having taxpayers
quantify and classify their intellectual capital expenditures. 263 Faced
with a system that allowed taxpayers to currently deduct some expenses,
capitalize and amortize others over varying periods, and never recover
still others (e.g., goodwill), depending on how they were classified,
taxpayers predictably engaged in aggressive tax-minimizing strategies
that were extremely difficult and costly for the IRS to monitor and
261. Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 6, at 683.
262. See U.S. S. COMM. ON FINANCE, SUMMARY OF STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT: COST RECOVERY
AND ACCOUNTING 8 n.2 (Nov. 21, 2013) [hereinafter U.S. S. COMM. ON FINANCE, COST RECOVERY]
available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Chairman's%2OStafl/ 20Discussion%
20Draft/o2Oon%2OCost/20Recovery/2and%20Accounting%20Summary.pdf; cf TAX REFORM
ACT OF 2014, supra note 216, at 56-57 (proposing to capitalize and amortize over five years R&D
and 50% of advertising); Johnson, First Do No Harm, supra note 14, at 551 (praising the proposals to
capitalize R&D and advertising).
263. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
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deter.264 Both the IRS and taxpayers wasted enormous resources
litigating capitalization controversies.
In addition to the administrative intractability of adopting Corrado,
Hulten, and Sichel's model for tax purposes, the data on which they
base their estimates are likely too uncertain to form the basis of a tax
capitalization system. Although suitable for their admittedly
"illustrative, not definitive"' 65 purposes, Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel are
at pains to point out that their estimates are often rough and somewhat
arbitrary and that their results are "clearly provisional., 266 For this
reason, the BEA limited its capitalization to R&D and artistic creations,
and indicated that the data is not yet reliable enough to capitalize
product design or organizational innovation.267 For tax purposes,
creating a complex matrix of expenditures with varying recovery
periods and methods of amortization based on insufficient or unsettled
empirical data is probably not acceptable from either a policy or a
political standpoint.
C. Reform Proposal
This author proposes that Congress require that all investments in
self-created intellectual capital be capitalized and amortized over a
single and fixed time period. To identify investments subject to this
treatment, the proposal would adopt Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel's
taxonomy. Thus, the proposal would apply to computer software,
scientific and nonscientific R&D, advertising, employee training, and
organizational innovation. 268 The proposal would apply to self-created
intellectual capital only. The current law's treatment of acquired
intellectual capital under I.R.C. § 197 would remain in place.
Consistent with the general treatment of capitalized expenditures
under current law, taxpayers would capitalize expenditures for specific
intellectual capital assets to the basis of those assets. For example, a
taxpayer would capitalize R&D to develop a patent to the basis of the
patent. This would enable the taxpayer to compute gain or loss upon the
sale or other disposition of an asset. Taxpayers would capitalize to
264. The same problem continues to exist with respect to the R&D credit. Taxpayers are
extremely aggressive about classifying which expenditures count as "qualified research
expenses," as defined by I.R.C. § 41(b). See generally Annette Nellen, Tax Treatment of Research
Expenditures (Oct. 2008), http://www.cob.sjsu.edu/nellena/223E%2OReading/Faxlncentives-
ResearchExpenditues.pdf (clarifying potential research expenses that qualify under I.R.C. § 41(b)).
265. See Corrado et al., Measuring Capital and Technology, supra note 6, at 38.
266. See Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 6, at 683.
267. See Lange, supra note 112 (interviewing BEA director Stephen Landefeld, who
indicated an interest in capitalizing product design and organizational planning, once reliable
data is available).
268. See supra text accompanying note 128.
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goodwill those expenditures, such as employee training and
organizational innovation, which do not create separate assets.269
As in Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel's model, only a percentage of
advertising expenses would be capitalized-the recent legislative
proposals of 50% seem reasonable in view of empirical estimates.270
Likewise, organizational innovation would include a fixed percentage of
overall managerial and executive compensation. 271 Corrado, Hulten, and
Sichel use 20% as an estimate of the managerial and executive time
devoted to organization change, although they admit that this
percentage is arbitrary.272 This author's proposal would adopt their 20%
as a general matter, but require a higher percentage-50%----of
executive compensation to be capitalized.273 After all, executives and
the compensation consultants extoll the rare and precious ability of
executives to formulate and execute long-range strategic visions and
plans. Management consultants routinely advise executives to reduce
the amount of time they spend on the mundane tasks of running their
businesses and to delegate those matters to underlings whenever
possible. As a political matter, executives would be hard-pressed to
argue that they do not provide long-term value to their companies.
Selecting a unitary amortization period for investments in self-
created intellectual capital under the proposal is challenging. Whatever
period Congress chooses will certainly be inaccurate for at least some
intellectual capital investments. I.R.C. § 197 establishes an important
precedent for this sort of tradeoff between a uniform but inaccurate
amortization period on one hand, and a simple rule that is easy to
administer and difficult to manipulate on the other. Congress estimated
this uniform fifteen-year period would raise revenue-an indication that
it erred on the side of a longer amortization period as compared to pre-
enactment law with respect to the assets covered by it. 274 The fifteen-
year period bears some relation to the composite useful life of the
intangibles that are subject to it, but policy and budgetary considerations
also drove the choice of fifteen years.275
269. The analogue under I.R.C. § 197 is any residual purchase price that is not allocated to
enumerated assets pursuant to I.R.C. § 1060. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
271. It would also include amounts paid to outside consultants.
272. See Corrado et al., Measuring Capital and Technology, supra note 6, at 29.
273. The executives whose compensation would be subject to this higher percentage of
capitalization would include the CEO plus the four highest compensated officers. Cf I.R.C.
§ 162(m)(3) (2012).
274. See Israel Blumenfrucht, Section 197: Intangible to Assess, MGMT. AcCT., May 1994,
at 22, 22 (noting that Congress scored I.R.C. § 197 as a revenue raiser because many intangible
assets would be amortized over a longer period than under prior law).
275. See Johnson, Extend the Life, supra note 14, at 1055-56.
2276 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66
The proposal outlined in this Article would similarly account for the
useful lives of all the covered investments, but as Corrado, Hulten, and
Sichel point out, the empirical data are limited and therefore, any
estimates would be very rough. A survey of their estimates for all
categories of intellectual property indicates a range of about three to
seven years.276 In line with what Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel report,
research from the United Kingdom has estimated the productive lives of
specific types of intellectual capital as follows: firm-specific training
(2.7 years), software (3.2 years), branding (2.8 years), R&D (4.6 years),
design (4 years), and business process improvement (4.2 years).277 In
contrast, recent OECD research indicates that productive lives might be
considerably longer. For example, the OECD finds that firms expect
investments in organizational capital to last an average of four to six
years in services, and between seven and ten years in manufacturing. 278
They also find that "R&D appears to be much more long-lived than
previously thought.,
279
To select an appropriate amortization period requires additional
careful thought and thorough examination of available empirical data.
For the time being, as a placeholder, this author proposes a five-year
amortization period.280 Regardless of the initial period selected, the
proposal would provide for a periodic assessment of the amortization
period with recalibration, if necessary. This would accommodate the
evolving body of empirical knowledge, as well as the likelihood that
useful lives of different investments will vary over time depending on a
multitude of factors, such as the rate of technological change, industry-
specific factors, and global economic conditions.
This proposal would result in a more accurate (or perhaps less
inaccurate) measurement of intellectual capital investments. It would
also raise substantial tax revenues which could be used to reduce the
national budget deficit, to finance government spending programs, or to
fund a reduction in tax rates or other tax reforms. To illustrate, the
House Ways and Means Committee has estimated that replacing the
deduction for scientific R&D with capitalization and five-year
amortization would increase tax revenues by $192.6 billion over the
next ten years.28' Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel estimated scientific R&D
to be less than one-fifth of all investments in intellectual capital for the
276. See Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 6, at 675-76.
277. See OECD REPORT, supra note 7, at 14.
278. See id.
279. See id. at 69.
280. The five-year period is consistent with recent legislative proposals relating to R&D,
advertising, and intangible drilling. See U.S. S. COMM. ON FINANCE, COST RECOVERY, supra note
262, at 8; see also TAx REFORM ACT OF 2014, supra note 216, at 55-56.
281. See TAXREFORMACTOF2014, supra note 216, at 55.
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years 2001-2003.282 Extrapolating from these estimates, the proposal
could increase revenues by as much as $1 trillion. The proposal would
also reduce the allocative inefficiencies that result from the current
law's under-taxation of income from intellectual capital.283
Furthermore, it would help establish a more accurate baseline measure
of income, which would enhance clarity and intentionality in decisions
to depart from that baseline.
CONCLUSION
In the taxation of intellectual capital, the stakes are high: One trillion
dollars per year of investments in intellectual capital and hundreds of
billions of dollars in tax revenues. This Article argues that tax
academics, lawmakers, and policymakers stand to gain much from an
interdisciplinary perspective when it comes to the taxation of
intellectual capital. Scholars in other fields make a theoretically
persuasive claim, thoroughly supported by decades of research, that
intellectual capital is a central driver of economic productivity that has
been poorly understood and inaccurately measured. Fortified by the
work of these scholars, this Article argues that tax law must reform its
fundamentally flawed treatment of intellectual capital.
In considering how Congress should reform tax law, this Article
endeavors to capitalize on the wealth of research and advances in other
fields, particularly those that share a common goal with tax law-the
accurate measurement of economic income. At the same time, this
Article remains cognizant of the unique objectives, needs, and design
constraints of the tax system. The result is a proposal that, although not
perfect, will measure income more effectively, raise tax revenues, and
improve the efficiency and fairness of the tax system.
282. For the years 2000-2003, they estimated total annual investment in intellectual capital
to be $1.226 trillion and scientific R&D to be $230.5 billion. See Corrado et al., Intangible
Capital, supra note 6, at 671 tbl.1.
283. See supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text.

